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THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE BY
PHYSICIANS TO PATIENTS: COMPETING
MODELS OF INFORMED CONSENT
Patrick D. Halligan*
The slave doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests-and
when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off-But the
other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practices upon
freemen;-he enters into discourse with the patient and with his
friends-and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced
him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under
his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he at-
tempts to effect a cure.
Plato, The Laws, Book IV
It appears to me a most excellent thing for the physician to
cultivate Prognosis; for by foreseeing and foretelling, in the
presence of the sick-he will be the more readily believed to be ac-
quainted with the circumstances of the sick; so that men will have
confidence to entrust themselves to such a physician. -Thus a man
will be the more esteemed to be a good physician-and by seeing
and announcing beforehand those who will live and those who will
die, he will thus escape censure.
Hippocrates, The Book of Prognostics
INTRODUCTION
An article on informed consent must justify the space in print it
seeks to occupy, as much has already been written on the subject. In
this paper the purposes are scientific, the thesis is the influence of
the tort of common law deceit, and the methods are partly
historical. The opinion in Small v. Gifford Memorial Hospital,1 lec-
tures and illustrations by Maitland, and reflection upon fraud allega-
tions in non-medical cases influenced the goals, thesis, and
methodology of this work.
*A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of Chicago. Member, Illinois Bar.
1. 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The opinion in Small appreciates that recognition of a tort of
failure by a physician to disclose risks to a patient, as well as a
definition of the tort's elements, are tasks of judicial legislation; and,
judicial legislation is limited by prior settled law because courts as a
matter of policy do not legislate "abrupt" changes in common law,
but rather modify prior forms so that changes in policy appear to be
"evolution." To proceed more rapidly would not only invade the pro-
vince of the legislature, but also might do injustice to a particular
party who has relied on prior law. The Small opinion suggests that
in the law of torts, including the law of "informed consent," analysis
of forms is essential to good judicial lawmaking and to justice in a
particular case.
This article's thesis is that the tort of deceit is an antecedent
from which courts expressly may draw more than they have in making
policy for medical disclosure cases; that values reflected in the tort
of deceit and ingrained in associated legal thinking unconsciously
motivate judicial opinions, which infrequently articulate that tort as
a contributor to the new forms; and that articulation of the contribu-
tion would be beneficial.
Constituent purposes are implied in the thesis and the main pur-
pose. By articulating the contribution of the tort of deceit and by ex-
amining how it combines with negligence and battery to form new
remedies, this paper seeks to identify alternatives for judicial
legislation, choice among which would not be "abrupt." Another pur-
pose is to locate and dissect the metaphors, analogies, and thought
patterns that judges employ, in order to better predict their deci-
sions. The former objective is to aid reviewing courts, legislatures,
and their critics, while the latter goal is to aid practitioners and
trial judges. Thus, while good law and care in law reform remain the
ultimate goal, the content of the paper is primarily scientific, identi-
fying models to describe and predict judicial behavior, by
highlighting available and foreseeable alternatives.
The essence of scientific method is the empirical testing of
hypotheses. Science, which depends on theories or models to direct
or focus empirical observation, develops by the formulation, revi-
sion, rejection, and confirmation of models in response to empirical
observation of behavior predicted by models. Four distinct models
represent how judges behave when they utter the phrase "informed
consent," and even these models do not account for all judicial con-
duct. But they should help lawyers to guide preparation and settle-
ment of most cases, to counsel clients seeking to conform with
judicial expectations, and to avoid adverse judicial reaction to con-
duct of the clients. In short, the four models of adjudication predict
how judges will behave in deciding informed consent cases.
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Three limitations on the use of models to predict judicial
behavior are imperfect compliance with precedent, judicial discre-
tion, and uncertainty. Models constructed from appellate opinions
best predict behavior of trial judges who conscientiously follow the
law. Unconscientious or unlearned trial judges are more unpredic-
table. Behavior of appellate courts is harder to predict than that of
conscientious trial judges, because appellate courts have more
discretion to make policy. They may select from various models,
fashion new ones, or change from one to another within the limits of
stare decisis. Rigid consistency at the policy level can be detri-
mental to the judicial process. The third limitation to which models
are vulnerable is uncertainty. Predictions themselves might in-
fluence judicial behavior, either by reinforcing a judge's decision
(self-fulfilling prediction) or changing it. A predictive article has side
effects; lawyers and judges sometimes choose to follow the predic-
tion, or they may repudiate models they might otherwise have
followed.
FAILURE TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT:
A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION
Disputes occur between physicians and their patients when an
attempted cure not only fails, but in fact aggravates the condition of
the patient despite skillful implementation of the technique or
method of cure, thus bitterly surprising the patient. The aggravation
is called a side effect or a collateral effect. The bitterness of a sur-
prise usually consists in a complaint that the physician knew that
the side effect was possible but did not tell the patient. The patient
usually suggests that he would not have taken the cure had he been
informed and would not, incidentally, have suffered the side effect.
These disappointments crystallize in the allegation that the doctor
did not obtain informed consent to the cure. Provisionally, lack of in-
formed consent is a doctrine about a doctor's liability for side effects
of touching which arise despite manual skill, and which surprise the
patient more than they surprise the physician.
When no treatment or harm has occurred, and no physical cause
has operated between the two, then there exists no dispute about in-
formed consent as defined here. These points seem obvious, but
they have been litigated.
Absence of treatment sometimes signals absence of a treating
relationship. For example, in Louisiana a genuine duty issue arose
regarding medical disclosure in Dowling v. Mutual Life Insurance
Company.2 The court ruled that an insurer's medical examiner was
2. 168 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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not obliged to disclose to an examinee-applicant diagnostic data
which he could have taken to his own doctor. A full doctor-patient
relationship did not exist, nor was there any treatment or side ef-
fect; thus, the case did not deal with informed consent in the usual
sense.
In a New York case, Karlson v. Guerinot, a treating relationship
existed, but no laying on of hands occurred. The court recognized no
informed consent tort in the case of a doctor who did not advise an
expectant mother that her baby might be deformed, on the rationale
that there is no laying on of hands or no "intrusion" into the body of
the mother which can be said to have produced a side effect.
But a similar case, Gleitman v. Cosgrove,4 in nearby New
Jersey, which might have emphasized that there had been no laying
on of hands, chose instead to reason that no cognizable harm had oc-
curred. In Gleitman, a pregnant woman had contracted German
measles. The defendant doctor who attended her failed to advise her
that there exists a 25% likelihood that a child born to a woman with
German measles will be deformed. The child was born deformed, but
the court reasoned that the treatment had caused no harm and that
there was no damage, because the birth of a deformed child is bet-
ter than the destruction of a fetus.
The questions of what is a side effect and of whether normal
consequences of ineffective treatment constitute side effects often
surface in sterilization cases. In Bennett v. Graves,5 a Kentucky
court approached the issues by using a malpractice model with
a moderately broad therapeutic privilege. The court stated that the
amount of information to give about the relative dangers and effec-
tiveness of hysterectomy and tubal ligation methods of sterilization
is a matter of medical judgment. The opinion assumes that an un-
wanted pregnancy can be an actionable side effect. An unwanted
result is the sort of corpus delicti one might expect in a deceit case,
but in a malpractice case a pathological result constitutes the corpus
delicti, and, though often inadvertent, pregnancy is not pathological.
The term "materialize" can be used to refer to the occurrence or
non-occurrence of a deleterious side effect within the ambit of risk
that ought to be disclosed. When the risk has not materialized,
failure to disclose that risk is not actionable as either negligence or
misrepresentation, though nondisclosure might be actionable as a
fictional battery. A Maine case, Downer v. Veilleaux, ruled that
3. 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
4. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
5. 557 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. App. 1977).
6. 332 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974). The case indicates that no compensation is available
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there could be no recovery on a record which shows that the un-
disclosed risk did not in fact materialize.
Materialization, a notion of harm or the absence of harm, ad-
dresses the existence or absence of the corpus delicti. The most
basic materialization issue is the existence of the effect or condition
which the plaintiff claims. In Small v. Gifford7 the defendants
disputed the existence anywhere in anyone of the disease which the
plaintiff claimed as a side effect of anesthesia during breast surgery.
A similar fundamental issue, disputed in Small, is whether the plain-
tiff suffers from a condition or disease known to exist, which could
be a side effect of treatment, or suffers instead from a different con-
dition which manifests similar symptoms but is not a side effect.
More typical is the issue of whether the treatment did or did not
physically and physiologically cause the plaintiff's disease or
damage, when such harm is sometimes produced as a collateral ef-
fect of the treatment. "Materialization," unless otherwise indicated,
means the last of or the collection of these three disputes. Resolu-
tion of these kinds of issues requires expert testimony consisting,
not of reports of occupational practices or standards, but of scien-
tific opinions on taxonomy and etiology (ie., on the character and
cause of disease).
A Louisiana appellate decision illustrates how corpus delicti,
cause-in-fact, and proximate cause blend and influence one another
in situations where management of risk and uncertainty is the
nature of the transaction. In Parker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine In-
surance Co..' a physician induced labor and the woman was injured.
The plaintiff claimed that she should have received information
about alternative methods of inducing labor. But statistical evidence
showed that the mishap which occurred was no more prevalent
among cases using the method employed than in cases using other
methods. The opinion states that when the risk of the particular
event in question is no different than the risk of the alternatives,
there is no "duty" to compare alternatives. A more traditional ap-
proach would say either that there was a duty but that the defen-
dant conformed to standards and thus did not breach his duty, or
that there was in fact no deleterious consequence from a breach, or
that the physician's unilateral choice of method did not cause the
harm.
for the intrusion itself; absent a side effect, there are no damages. That is, there is no
room for fictional battery in Maine. The opinion inclines far toward the misrepresenta-
tion model and an actual reliance element, but acknowledges that the absence of
materialization of the risk made it unnecessary to select a model.
7. 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975).
8. 335 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
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But use of an explanation hinging on causation creates prob-
lems. Legal cause-in-fact is the notion of a necessary pre-condition or
of an antecedent event (but-for causation). The medical procedure in
Parker in this sense caused the harm. The ultimate harm was physi-
cal damage. But the mediation was creation of risk. Yet there was
no increment of added risk created by the choice the physician
made. In this sense there was no corpus delicti, no prescribed situa-
tion, no disruption of order, nor enlargement of jeopardy. The
equivalency of hazards created a unitary, unavoidable degree of risk
which, though not the same thing as an unavoidable accident, has a
similar moral quality. The concept of an unavoidable accident is a
causal notion. Heuristically, then, the non-liability of the defendant
in Parker approximates the non-liability of one who has caused no
harm. A less metaphysical rationalization would redirect attention
from the culpability and potency of the defendant's deeds to the
needs of the plaintiff, viz., materiality: when the risks are the same
in severity, quality, and probability, they are irrelevant to the deci-
sion.
Subjective response to data is a fact which also will preempt
other issues and, in a case of first impression in a jurisdiction, will
obviate the need to select a model for a new tort.' It should be ob-
vious that non-causation here is very different from non-
materialization, i.e., from the issue of physical causation, which must
be distinguished from reliance.
The most celebrated case which turned upon physical or
physiological causation was Karp v. Cooley,"0 tried by a federal court
in Texas applying Texas law. In that case the trial court directed a
verdict for the defendant because his prima facie case had not proved
causation by expert testimony. Dr. Cooley, the defendant, had ex-
perimented on the late Mr. Karp with an artificial heart which even
the doctor's own university medical committee had not cleared for
clinical trial in humans. A risk of the artificial heart is damage to
blood cells and kidneys. Mr. Karp experienced that injury, but a
hostile doctor called by the plaintiff refused to express an opinion on
whether the experimental heart had caused the damage to Karp's
blood and kidneys. The reviewing court affirmed the judgment for
the defendant. The case illustrates poignantly that the interests the
malpractice model primarily protects are good care and avoidance of
9. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975). The plaintiff in Poulin
admitted that the procedure would have taken place even if the information had been
given. The absence of actual reliance preempted the other issues. Besides noting
reliance as an element, the Alaska law of informed consent is uncertain.
10. 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
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bad medical consequences, not the dignity of the patient per se. The
defendant used a dying man in a clinical trial which Baylor Univer-
sity colleagues said should not have been conducted, but was
discharged of liability at the close of the plaintiff's case because
Texas follows the medical malpractice model." In that model, failure
to obtain informed consent is a failure of disclosure before a treat-
ment that causes a side effect.
Disclosure before treatment by touching is not the only cir-
cumstance in which a doctor or medical worker may be liable for
failure to disclose a risk. Warning a patient invitee of dangers on
the premises, or of the fact he has been exposed inadvertently to
contagion or radiation, or advising him how to use prescribed
medicines or appliances which are dangerous unless used properly
are obvious examples of obligations to advise which differ from the
obligation to disclose in order to obtain informed consent to treat-
ment. Even more obvious is an obligation to have and give
knowledge when the patient primarily seeks, not manual finesse, but
the information itself. The best example is genetic counselling. A
physician who ignorantly says that a condition is not inheritable
when it is may be liable, not for want of disclosure incidental to
treatment, but for misfeasance in the main task engaged." Other ex-
amples are unskillful disclosure to third persons (e.g., employers, in-
surers) who have employed a physician to examine a person and to
report findings; failure to disclose a condition to a public authority
(vital statistics and disease control legislation); or nondisclosure to a
stranger (e.g., a potential victim of a psychiatrist's homicidal
psychotic patient)."
Despite its growth, informed consent is a comparatively in-
significant source of medical litigation. Informed consent counts
usually accompany separate counts of negligent manipulation or
mistaken choice of treatment, and no inconsistency exists between
such counts. They may be cumulative and not alternative.' Plaintiffs
may try to gore the defendants on the horns of a dilemma, the
points of which are informed consent and res ipsa loquitur, as il-
lustrated by the thyroidectomy cases. In Di Filippo v. Preston" the
11. 493 F.2d at 422.
12. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
The decision consolidated two cases. Plaintiffs in both brought so-called "wrongful life"
claims regarding handicapped infants. The court pointed out that many disparate torts
exist under that umbrella.
13. See Shea, Legal Standard of Care for Psychologists and Psychiatrists, 6 W.
ST. U.L. REV. 71, 90-96 (1978).
14. Mayor v. Dowsett, 400 P.2d 234 (Or. 1965).
15. 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961). Other thyroidectomy cases blending informed
consent and res ipsa locquitur include Collins v. Itoh, 503 P.2d 36 (Mont. 1972), Wood
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plaintiff suffered from goiter (inflamation of the thyroid). The defen-
dant surgeon, Dr. Preston, removed the thyroid by the "standard
technique," which leaves intact that 5% of the thyroid in which the
laryngeal nerves often are found. The competing Lahey technique
visualizes and sets aside the nerves and removes almost all of the
thyroid. By either method some 2/0 of thyroidectomy patients suffer
nerve damage, vocal chord paralysis, and voice diminution or loss,
because the course of nerves through the thyroid varies in each pa-
tient, and even slight squeezing or stretching of the nerves can
damage them. The Di Filippo opinion expressly adopts the malprac-
tice model of disclosure with the comment"6 that informing a patient
of a risk might be a deviation from standards if, in the best interest
of the patient, competent physicians would not reveal the risk. The
opinion affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the res ipsa
point in deference to statistical evidence that voice loss occurs only
in 2% of the cases performed even by the best-trained surgeons,
and on the informed consent count because all of the expert
testimony agreed that the practice among local physicians was not
to warn. Other combinations of informed consent and res ipsa are
the spinal burns in ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center17
and shoulder-arm paralysis in Martin v. Stratton,18 where res ipsa
was not applied, because the evidence showed a strong chance that
the negligence of non-parties had caused the harm. Likewise, the in-
formed consent theory failed in Martin because the nerve injury was
unprecedented in the observations of the three anesthesiologists
who testified and because there was no evidence that competent
doctors even recognize, let alone disclose, such risks.'9
By combining informed consent and res ipsa, plaintiffs seek to
confront their defendants with this dilemma: if the doctor does not
testify to the possibility of harm despite manual skill and fails to say
that the harm in question represents the materialization of an in-
herent, collateral risk, the judge may instruct the jury that unex-
plained harm may itself be evidence of negligence. But if the physi-
cian does testify to those things, the plaintiff needs no expert in a
v. Roberts, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962), and Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136
S.E.2d 617 (1964).
16. 53 Del. at 539, 173 A.2d at 339. The version of the new tort urged by the
plaintiff conceded a broad privilege not to warn if a warning would have "unduly
alarmed" the patient; the court restated the broad privilege so conceded.
17. 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
18. 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973).
19. The elements of scienter, medical standards, and materiality having failed, the
court affirmed the directed verdict for defendant in the trial court and reversed the in-
termediate appellate court, but declined to select among malpractice, misrepresenta-
tion, or a hybrid, saying all three had failed.
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misrepresentation model state to get to the jury on the other count,
failure to obtain informed consent. The interaction of the elements
of res ipsa and informed consent is indeed problematical to medical
defendants. With the notion of informed consent in mind, an inquiry
into the background and development of the tort is proper.
EVOLUTION OF LAW AND MODELS OF THE TORT
OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT
Common law is evolutionary, and the impetus of its evolution is
analogy, as used in attorneys' arguments and in appellate rationales.
The following analogies have contributed to informed consent case
opinions.
Battery Model
Much judicial behavior is described by a model which supplied
an early analogy for the tort of failure to obtain informed consent.
The model, which is not concerned with side effects but with the
bodily intrusion itself, is the technical battery model.
When a doctor touches a patient, invading his body in a manner
or by a treatment to which the patient has not consented, the doctor
has committed the tort of battery. Though failure to obtain informed
consent differs from actual failure to obtain consent, the tort of bat-
tery has contributed much to the appearance of the new tort. Thus
battery cases involving the absence of consent by the patient should
be studied. Their concept is not gratuitous battery between
strangers, but battery arising in the course of treatment by a physi-
cian whose patient has consented to some touching.
Slater v. Baker and Stapleton" is strikingly pertinent despite
the passage of more than two centuries, and presents both medical
misadventure and an instance of exemplary judicial behavior, nicely
balancing doctrinal order and justice.
The Chief Justice of the Court of Kings Bench in 1767 was
Wilmot who, during Michaelmas term in that year, presided at the
trial by jury in the case. Surgeons testified on each side, regarding
the proper surgical practice in seeking consent of patients to
straighten broken limbs previously set and partially healed. The
testimony of the plaintiff and his relatives included repeated asser-
tions that if asked for permission to use the procedure in question,
he would not have consented. The testimony on the plaintiffs case,
lay and expert, implied a cause of action based on what would now
20. 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767).
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be referred to as a negligence theory and an element of subjective
reliance. Specifically, the plaintiff had pleaded trespass on a special
case which evolved to negligence, deceit, and assumpsit, among
other forms. In Slater, contractual and delictual components
operated together, since the theory of the plaintiff's cause of action
drew also upon contract. The pleading misadventure consisted in the
irony that the proof offered was thought by the Chief Justice, by
the jury, and even by defense counsel to fulfill the elements of the
more culpable tort of trespass vi et armis. The jury had returned
an extremely large verdict of 500 pounds, and Chief Justice Wilmot
complimented the jurors and stated he was "well satisfied" with the
verdict, although malpractice insurance did not exist, and the co-
defendant Baker was "celebrated" not only for skill, but for
humanitarianism in other endeavors. The defense experts praised
the defendant and the evidence showed he had for twenty years
been first surgeon of St. Bartholomews and had lectured to others
upon surgery and anatomy. The other defendant, Stapleton, was an
apothecary who sought aid from Baker when Slater asked Stapleton
to remove the bandages from the patient's broken leg, which had
been set earlier by others.
Baker arrived with an iron machine of his own devising, which
was unknown to the other surgeons who testified; he used it to re-
break the leg'suddenly, then to extend the leg and re-straighten it.
The standard method was compression, not extension, and it was
the commonly accepted practice to avoid breaking the patient's
callous. It appears that the leg healed again but very slowly; the
plaintiff sought satisfaction for disability and pain during the delay.
The defendants offered no evidence to contradict the plaintiff's
testimony about the occurrence of the injury and about what words
had been spoken by the doctor. The defendants' experts only
testified to the reputation of defendant Baker for skill and kindness.
The liability of the apothecary was based on a contractural theory
proveable under special case, but the undisguised motive of the
judge was to remedy the trespass vi et armis committed by both
defendants. The judge denied a motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto and stated that he would not look at the evidence with an
eagle's eye to see that it perfectly fit the allegation. But instead, he
would adjudge for the plaintiff to the extent that the remedy sought
in the writ was justified by the evidence. The record made by the
plaintiff on his allegation of trespass on the case was fuller than, but
not adverse to, the proof of trespass vi et armis; the proof offered
tended to corroborate the trespassory culpability of the defendants
by showing that surgeons do not presume to straighten bones
without consent and do not claim immunity from writs of trespass
when acting without permission. Commenting on the novel machine
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and the unusual procedure, the Chief Justice reflected upon the
irony that most often it is not the least skillful practitioner but the
most skillful one who will be tempted to "experiment"; the Chief
Justice commented further that there is no right to experiment
without express permission and that to do so is rash and wrongful.2
Perhaps the strategy of counsel for the plaintiff to prove deviation
from professional standards was prompted by fear that the defend-
ants would, by perjury, contradict his client's report and that the
jury would believe them. In the defense, counsel and client at-
tempted to interpose a paternalistic privilege which failed; they
then attacked the verdict as motivated by misconduct not pleaded.
But consideration of three leading American cases which occurred
after negligence was well established as a separate tort, distinct
from trespass, shows the progenitor tort survives.
The most celebrated decision is Mohr v. Williams.22 In that case
a patient consented to surgery on the right ear; but the surgeon
operated on the left when, during the surgery, he found that the left
ear, not the right, needed the operation. The opinion affirms a judg-
ment for the plaintiff and rejects three attractive defense
arguments: (1) the benefits to the patient; (2) the absence of an in-
tent to harm; and (3) implied consent. The rejection of the first argu-
ment, the benefits of the surgery, underlines the interest protected:
"the right to the inviolability" of one's person.
Cited in Mohr was the intermediate appellate decision reviewed
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Pratt v. Davis."3 Without describing
the scope of surgery he contemplated, the defendant surgeon
operated twice on the plaintiff and removed her uterus and ovaries.
The plaintiff and her husband asserted that neither of them had con-
sented to such extensive procedures. Rejecting defenses like those
advanced in Mohr, the opinion reasoned that "consent should be a
pre-requisite to a surgical operation," ' and affirmed an award of
compensatory and punitive damages.
Rolater v. Strain5 and Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital" follow Pratt. Schloendorff gave Judge Cardozo an oppor-
tunity to exercise his craft in creating new rights or immunities by
ingenious judicial revision of pre-existing entitlements or defenses,
and by articulating the new principles so epigrammatically as to make
21. Id. at 862-63.
22. 95 Minn. 26, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
23. 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
24. 224 Ill. at 305, 79 N.E. at 564.
25. 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) (unauthorized removal of bone in foot).
26. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 133 N.Y.S. 1143 (1914).
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them appear puny and foreseeable, when they were latently large,
novel, and redistributive. He opined:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation, without his patient's consent com-
mits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. 7
In Mohr, Pratt, and Schloendorff, the courts brushed aside the
benefits defense. If side effects are not the grounds for the action,
then rejection of a benefits defense, while not logically necessary, is
not surprising. However, if side effects are the gist of the action, the
disallowance of a benefits defense is both unlikely and harsh." To
call attention to benefits accompanying the side effects is like an af-
firmative partial defense of mitigation. Logically, a plaintiff should
have to prove his net damages by demonstrating the benefits he
would have lost had he postponed or foregone treatment because he
knew the risk of the side effect. But the cases do not recognize this
partial defense, nor do they allocate the burdens of pleading or of
proof. Alert defense counsel should construct a record that shows
the benefits of the treatment undertaken and the deterioration likely
to have occurred had plaintiff foregone, postponed, or restricted his
treatment. This partial benefits defense is referred to as the Waltz-
Inbau credit.
Besides rejecting the benefits defense, the courts in Mohr,
Pratt, and Schloendorff narrowed the defense of implied consent.
The defense is one of actual consent by the patient, implied from
surrounding circumstances, except in extreme emergencies when
the law constructs the "consent." This concept differs from the no-
tion of "informed consent," which involves information. Though
courts often imply consent in medical battery cases, local variations
exist, and the implication is not guaranteed.' Three contemporary
27. 211 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93, 133 N.Y.S. at 1145.
28. J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 152-78 (1971).
29. Ironically, the state least willing to apply the informed consent doctrine ap-
pears to be Georgia. In Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (applying Georgia
law), a doctor cut into a wider area of the face and neck of plaintiff than he said he
would when he found that a cyst he sought to remove was more widespread than first
supposed. Despite the exercise of care, the doctor injured the plaintiffs nerve in the
wider area of surgery. In most jurisdictions, the case would be regarded as an illustra-
tion of implied consent; the patient was awake, as a local anesthetic was employed.
The patient did not interrupt the surgeon as he cut into the wider areas. The court af-
firmed a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The irony consists in the fact that
Georgia does not recognize failure to give information coupled with a harmful effect as
a separate cause of action. See, e.g., Park v. Palmyra Park Hosp., 139 Ga. App. 457,
228 S.E.2d 596 (1976).
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battery cases from western states deal with interpretation of
language to ascertain the scope of consent.
Cathemer v. Hunter"0 is a novel "reverse battery" case from
Arizona in which the doctor did too little. The patient had not con-
sented to a small procedure, but had insisted on a more ambitious
operation. The plaintiff specifically asked for a hip replacement like
the one he had heard a radio celebrity praise. The doctor boasted
that he was the surgeon for the operation. However, he merely
secured the hip with a metal pin called a hip prosthesis, which ir-
ritated the hip area and had to be removed. The plaintiff had signed
a consent to hip prosthesis installation, but no one explained the
term to him. The court properly brushed aside the form. The opinion
states that actual consent is a question of the reasonable intent of
the parties. 1 The court restated" the testimony of the plaintiff that
he would not have agreed to the installation of the prosthesis had he
known the nature of the procedure. The court demonstrated the
absence of actual consent rather than subjective reliance, though the
terms have similar meanings. The court employed the battery
model, the only theory pleaded," but also reversed a directed ver-
dict for the defendant and instructed" the trial court to allow the
plaintiff to amend his complaint to include negligence or breach of
contract theories. The opinion states that the plaintiff also may
assert battery because the alleged malpractice occurred before the
effective date of a malpractice statute. In a footnote 5 the court con-
cluded that the legislature had "abrogated" prospectively the right
of a patient to sue a doctor for assault or battery. The statutory con-
struction is questionable." Arizona physicians may not engage in anti-
social conduct, and the legislature did not intend to immunize them
from liability for vicious behavior. The only restriction is that if one
suffers battery, he should plead that tort, as did the plaintiff in
Cathemer, and not "malpractice." In Cathemer there also appears the
most absurd, though charming, of the many concepts created by in-
formed consent cases: analogizing to criminal pleading, counsel for
the defense argued that an express bargain for a total hip replace-
30. 27 Ariz. App. 780, 558 P.2d 975 (1976).
31. 27 Ariz. App. at 783, 558 P.2d at 978.
32. 27 Ariz. App. at 782 & 784-85, 558 P.2d at 977 & 979-80.
33. 27 Ariz. App. at 781, 558 P.2d at 976.
34. 27 Ariz. App. at 785, 558 P.2d at 980.
35. 27 Ariz. App. at 783 n.2, 558 P.2d at 978 n.2.
36. In Reidesser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975), the court affirmed a
summary judgment for defendant but reminded that general adoption of a negligence
model does not imply the unavailability of battery remedies for a case in which non-
disclosure of risks amounts nearly to nondisclosure of the procedure contemplated and
regions affected. Subjective reliance is required.
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ment authorizes a hip prosthesis because the prosthesis is a "lesser-
included" operation within the replacement.
In the second contemporary western battery case, Corn v.
French,7 a hostile witness called by the plaintiff corroborated the
defendant's testimony that there was no pathologist nearby,
although the witness acknowledged that pathological study should
precede mastectomy, if possible. The defendant had proposed a biopsy,
but during surgery he diagnosed a malignancy and removed the
plaintiff's breast. The court reversed a directed verdict for the
defendant and reflected that the defense could present a medical ex-
igencies justification that might satisfy a jury on retrial. The case
apparently involved an actual, technical battery in which the issue
was implied consent and thus was not an authentic informed consent
case.38 The plaintiff had signed a consent to mastectomy, but no one
defined the word for her, so the court ignored the consent form.
The third case, Doerr v. Movius,39 was no more than a technical
battery claim for an instrusion to which implied consent was found.
The patient asked the surgeon to repair a hernia which the parties
thought was on the patient's left side. During the operation the
surgeon found the hernia on the right side; he repaired it without
causing side effects, though additional scarring occurred. The court
ruled for the defendant. Linguistic construction and ascertainment
of intent can reconcile this case with Mohr. In Doerr the parties in-
tended to repair the hernia, and its location was only secondary. In
Mohr, the plaintiff intended to consent to surgery on only one ear.
The Initiation of the New Tort
The first case to focus on the concept of "informed consent"
rather than actual consent was Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univer-
sity." In Salgo, the court defined the doctor's obligation to his pa-
tient as not to "withhold any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treat-
ment." 1 This definition created a new obligation, because, unlike the
cases discussed previously, Salgo required the sharing of informa-
tion, which is more than assumed actual consent. The case involved
an aortograph procedure which resulted in paralysis. The complaint
alleged, and the court instructed on, negligence. The rationale did
37. 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
38. The wide opportunity for the doctor to plead implied consent suggests that in
an authentic side effects informed consent case Nevada will opt for a malpractice
model with a wide therapeutic privilege.
39. 463 P.2d 477 (Mont. 1970).
40. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
41. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
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not rest on a battery theory, although the court did not abrogate
prior decisions recognizing battery in the absence of actual consent.
Instead, the court created a new tort whose remedies cumulate with
older forms. The reasoning of the trial court and the appellate opin-
ion are more suggestive of deceit or misrepresentation than of bat-
tery or negligence, although the deceit model is not well articulated.
In 1960, a Kansas opinion, Natanson v. Kline, 2 struggled with
battery and negligence in seeking a ground for this new cause of ac-
tion. The court declared that the action was a part of the tort of
negligence.
In 1965 the court of appeals of Arizona discussed the issue,
acknowledged the confusion between negligence and battery, and
concluded that the action lies in either tort. Actually, the informed
consent cause of action is not a product of either tort. The opinion is
an example of the confusion into which courts fall when analyzing
the new cause of action:
Summarizing, we hold that a consent to a surgical procedure is
effected if the consentor understands substantially the nature of
the surgical procedure attempted and the probable results of the
operation. This, as a matter of law, constitutes an informed con-
sent. Lacking this, the operation is a battery unless some special
exception pertains. Given an informed consent, liability, if any,
must be predicated in malpractice. In malpractice, the duty of
the physician to disclose is determined by the normal practices
of his profession in the particular community. We do not at-
tempt to determine the law in the case of particularly dangerous
operations, when some courts have ruled as a matter of law that
disclosure must be made . . . If it is found that the standard of
disclosure has been breached in the particular case, and if injury
has resulted therefrom, then there is liability in malpractice.
Whether there was sufficient evidence in this case, arising from
the testimony of the defendant-doctor or otherwise, to go to the
jury on the question of whether the defendant-doctor breached a
duty to disclose we need not decide because there is no showing
here that the failure to disclose resulted in the plaintiffs unfor-
tunate condition.43
A misrepresentation element emerges from these early rulings.
The constant attention given to negligence and battery in the first
informed consent opinions suggests that the emphasis on misre-
presentation in the contemporary decisions is either a new mark or
42. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
43. Shelter v. Rochell, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 79, 86 (1965) (citations omitted).
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an atavism. But judicial distaste for misrepresentation or conceal-
ment is obvious in Salgo, Natanson, and Shetter. The highlighted
traits may be negligence and battery, but the focus on those
characteristics does not hide the tort of deceit in the pioneer cases.
An examination of the cases following Salgo in California proves
this parentage. In Salgo the appellate court reversed and remanded
because the trial court had instructed the jury that a doctor must
advise a patient of "all facts" which affect the interest of the patient
and of "all risks, if any."" The appellate court stated that an instruc-
tion should contain the proviso that a doctor has discretion to
withhold information in order to prevent an adverse reaction, to pre-
vent a reluctant patient from refusing beneficial treatment, or to ad-
vance the welfare of the patient. The decision suggests case-by-case
evaluation by the trial courts. As stated, the opinion utilizes a
malpractice model. But the court stated that the right to choose is a
separate right a doctor must balance with good health care and ad-
monished that doctors should not minimize risks or their duty to
disclose them. This notion of balancing interests implies a necessary
element of objective materiality and requires expert testimony to
determine the fulfillment or breach of the duty in any one case; ie.,
the standards of disclosure are medical, professional standards.
However, by 1972 a concept of a misrepresentation model employing
subjective standards had arisen.45
In Cobbs v. Grant," the court purported to follow a negligence
model 7 but drastically narrowed the therapeutic privilege of Salgo
and heightened the importance of the patient's interest in informa-
tion, unless the patient asks not to be informed of the risks." The
plaintiff often must present medical testimony to establish the ex-
istence and probability of risks and to prove the de facto
materialization of a collateral risk, but he need not present expert
testimony concerning other issues. A pre-Cobbs appellate case" and
44. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
45. Malpractice persisted for a time. See Dunlap v. Marine, 242 Cal. App. 2d 162,
51 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1966).
46. 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
47. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512, 502 P.2d at 8.
48. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516, 502 P.2d at 12.
49. See Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969). Berkey
finds the source of the obligation to disclose in the fiduciary aspects of the doctor-
patient relationship and not in a standard of care. Cobbs does not totally undercut this
reasoning. The motive of the action is the patient's desire for and expectation of infor-
mation. In this model, patients of doctors are much like clients of lawyers. However, in
Berkey the doctor performed a myelogram when he had obtained consent for an elec-
tromyogram. Consequently, under the facts, a technical battery was at issue, and the
informed consent discussion is properly read only as dicta.
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Cobbs firmly cement California law to the misrepresentation mold,
notwithstanding the insistence in the latter case that negligence is
the gist of the tort. These cases imply subjective reliance as an ele-
ment but concede that expert testimony is required as a
foundation." In Cobbs the court was unclear" about the relationship
between the severity and the incidence of risk as a basis for
testimony on reliance; evidence of those things is required not merely
as a foundation for proof of reliance, but for other reasons. The
court indicated that objective materiality is also required. Yet dicta
in one case suggests that expert testimony about the magnitude of a
risk may be excused if the existence of the particular risk is
established in a less statistically specific manner and if the
plaintiffs subjective reliance and the fact of materialization are cer-
tain. 2 Particularly in a consumer model jurisdiction, the defense of
"ignorance requested" by the patient 5 is recognized. Finally, battery
remedies are not abolished but are "reserved"5' to cases of a ge-
nuine absence of consent. This attention to the materiality of facts
and reliance upon them suggests the tort of deceit.
The Deceit Model and Definition of Terms
Elements of the Tort of Deceit
The battery and negligence analogies are mentioned frequently
as contributing to the new tort of failure to obtain informed consent.
Another doctrinal and ethical influence that is apparent but is less
frequently articulated is the tort of deceit, which, like negligence,
derived from trespass through case. The equitable doctrine that
paralleled deceit was the ground of fraud for cancellation of in-
struments and contracts; today the word "fraud" often is used to
refer to the common law suit as well. Two models must be used to
describe adequately the judicial behavior in the United States that
followed Salgo but deemphasized the battery analogy; these are the
professional negligence model and the consumer misrepresentation
model. Another model existing in a few jurisdictions, fictional bat-
tery, employs freely the tort of battery as an analogy.
50. Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
51. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515, 502 P.2d at 11.
52. Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center, 54 Cal. App. 521, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681
(1976). The reliance of the plaintiff was suspect in Morgenroth, because he had con-
sented despite having received information about risks of death and of "serious
disease."
53. See Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1970).
54. Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (1972).
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The elements of deceit are familiar.5 To recover, the plaintiff
must prove: (1) a statement, a guilty silence, or a concealment by the
defendant of a fact (as distinguished from a promise); (2) the inac-
curacy of the statement or of the impression created by silence or
concealment; (3) the objective materiality of the fact to the plaintiffs
decision; (4) an actual subjective reliance by the plaintiff on the
statement or impression; (5) the defendant's knowledge of the falsi-
ty of the statement or impression (or reckless or negligent disregard
of falsity); (6) an intent by the defendant to produce reliance and to
induce action by the plaintiff; (7) a loss suffered by the plaintiff; and
(8) causation-in-fact of the loss by the induced action or inaction.
An allegation of common law deceit seeking damages for a side
effect occurred in the Virginia case of Hunter v. Burroughs." In
Hunter the plaintiff alleged that a doctor had not warned of x-ray
burns and had misled the plaintiff by inaccurately advising that
x-ray treatment would cure his eczema. The plaintiff also alleged
that he would not have accepted treatment had he been warned.
The plaintiff alleged both negligence and misleading conduct of the
physician. The court overruled a demurrer, commenting that the
failure to warn was not negligence per se. The opinion stresses the
importance of subjective reliance but does not excuse the allegations
of scienter, materiality, and the othe!r elements of deceit.
Concealment means an affirmative act to frustrate an inspection
or otherwise to prevent access to a fact. A guilty silence differs in
that it constitutes nondisclosure and not affirmative action. Absent
a statute requiring disclosure, silence is actionable only when
preceded by an erroneous, ambiguous, or incomplete statement of a
defendant who later learns that his prior statement is misleading or
will produce an unexpected reliance. The two other exceptions to
nondisclosure are fiduciary relationships and a trade custom of
disclosure. The last exception, custom, reaches only "basic" facts. 7
The affirmative duty to disclose risks in informed consent cases can
be grounded on the theory that the relationship between patient
and physician is one of trust and confidence. 8 But this notion is used
primarily in cases testing the validity of contracts and conveyances
and is not meant to define the nature of the professional relation-
ship. Moreover, the institutional nature of modern medicine makes
this conception of the doctor-patient relationship untenable. Indeed,
55. See, e.g., 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7 (1956); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 520-72 (4th ed. 1971).
56. 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550-51 (1976).
58. 61 AM JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 100 (1972).
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the absence of trust spawns informed consent cases. The doctrine of
informed consent is a new exception to the requirement of an affir-
mative act or a statement in the torts of misrepresentation and
deceit where those models control informed consent litigation.
The defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his statement or of
the patient's impression is called scienter. 9 A doctor is not expected
to be aware of unusual risks unknown even by specialists in the
field."0 Similarly, the courts will not require the physician to disclose
familiar risks associated with a hidden complication."
Materiality and reliance differ, and a plaintiff usually must prove
both. Those elements become confused because the facts proving
one often tend to establish the other. Materiality is rational impor-
tance considered objectively; reliance is actual subjective decision-
making and risk aversion.
In deceit cases "proximate cause" need not be proved. The name
of that doctrine is a misnomer, as it has nothing to do with cause
and effect; but rather, the concept serves to limit liability to some,
but not all, actual consequences resulting from a tort." This limita-
tion is appropriate irn negligence cases but rarely in intentional
torts, and deceit usually is considered an intentional tort. In addi-
tion, deceit does not conform to the classical uses of the phrase
"proximate cause" in speaking of materiality or reliance. Materiality
and reliance should not be confused with each other and neither of
them should be confused with "proximate cause." Actual reliance is
a necessary, though not always a sufficient, cause-in-fact in deceit
cases. 3 However, in this paper cause-in-fact denotes the materializa-
tion (not the materiality) of the risk, ie., the occurrence, during or
after the treatment, of the potential harm of which the doctor
should have warned.
From deceit have emerged many modern causes of action allow-
ing consumers and investors to cancel transactions and to recover
their money or consequential damages. As in other actions evolving
through case, some deleterious consequence beyond mere anger is a
necessary element. The artifice and the fact of having been duped
are not actionable. Deceit thus differs from battery, in which the in-
vasion is per se actionable and damages are presumed. But both
59. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at § 7.13.
60. Campbell v. Thornton, 368 Mass. 528, 333 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
61. See, e.g., Black v. McKay, 80 S.D. 469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964) (complications
producing the risks not noticed until late in surgery and afterwards; no obligation to
disclose risks).
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 55, at §§ 253-58.
63. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at § 7.13.
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deceit and battery may support an award of punitive damages if the
intent includes not only the animus to touch or mislead but a design
to hurt, exploit, or humiliate the plaintiff. The availability of
punitive damages depends on the intent vel non dichotomy and not
upon the trespass-case dichotomy.
Unless punitive damages are sought, the only relevant intent is
one to create a false impression and to induce reliance; an intent to
harm a person or property need not be established. But a
defendant's desire to aid the plaintiff (e.g., to make him rich or to
heal him) is no defense, since the interest protected by a deceit ac-
tion is the information needed for a decision, although not every in-
vasion of the interest is actionable.
If scienter and materiality are the gist of the action, expert
testimony on the standards of disclosure of persons engaged in the
defendant's trade, occupation, or profession apparently has no place.
The important question is how the law should measure materiality
in the medical context, since medical concerns differ from those in
financial or investment settings.
Materiality And Its Calculus
The magnitude of the harm and the likelihood of a side effect
are two factors of obvious interest to a rational patient. The rational
importance of information to a patient is the product of the
magnitude and likelihood of risk; the model of objective materiality
seeks to measure the importance of information in terms of a certain
or constant amount. This model resembles Learned Hand's formula
for measuring clear and present danger as announced in United
States v. Dennis.4 The problem is defining an appropriate constant
or standard. Few cases provide answers, but commentators identify
two primary means of measurement and a third middle ground. One
measure is a degree of materiality which would deter treatment.
Another is an amount that would "influence" the patient's decision
or would provoke serious reflection. Without addressing the issue
expressly, cases following the consumer model generally employ the
"influential" version of materiality. A third measure combines the
influence and deterrence by defining materiality as the importance
to which a typical patient "attach[es] significance" when deciding to
"undergo" a treatment. 5 The third formulation became law in the
District of Columbia Circuit in Canterbury v. Spence."6
64. 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
65. Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 268,
640 (1969).
66. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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The Canterbury opinion makes the District of Columbia a mis-
representation model jurisdiction. 7 The weakest aspect of the opin-
ion is particularly relevant: the court stated that part of the issue
of causation-in-fact is whether disclosure would have produced a
decision against treatment. However, by insisting that courts should
resolve the causality issue "on an objective basis,""8 Canterbury col-
lapses reliance into materiality and requires only the latter. The
court followed the Waltz-Scheuneman analysis69  in equating
materiality and reliance.
The risk materializing in Canterbury had a probability of only
1%. But, as the risk approaches zero probability, even the District
of Columbia relieves the doctor of a duty to warn."0 Canterbury and
Haven together require actual subjective reliance and a measure of
objective materiality, despite the fact that Canterbury could be read
as imposing a duty to reveal a 1% risk. The calculus of materiality,
however, erases such a suggestion. The opinion provides that the
first step in ascertaining materiality is to multiply the severity of a
risk times its frequency or probability.7 1 Thus, the decision did not
announce a 1% rule for every risk.
Alternatively, liability may be determined by comparing the
product of severity of harm times its likelihood to the probable
benefits of the treatment or costs to the patient's health of postpon-
ing, restricting, or foregoing the treatment. Inserting the third
variable into the calculation computes negligence by the three-
variable algebraic method Learned Hand defined in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co."2
The continuous, linear model of Carroll is not the only possible
method. For example, the harm element may be paramount for
67. The position evolved partly from a warranty analogy. See Johnson v. Rodis,
251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Under Canterbury, the duty to disclose exists in-
dependently of medical custom. 464 F.2d at 786. Expert testimony is not required ex-
cept when causation of the claimed side effect or the question of magnitude of the risk
is at issue. Id. at 791. But the defendant may use expert testimony to establish an af-
firmative defense of therapeutic privilege which is narrowly circumscribed and which
must be based on the opinions and practices of those who reject paternalistic theories
of medicine. Id. at 789. At the same time, the court stated that a feared reaction by
the patient must be "menacing" to constitute cause to invoke the privilege. The risk
that a patient might forego needed therapy is likely to constitute a menacing reaction
only rarely.
68. Id. at 790-91.
69. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 65.
70. See, e.g., Haven v. Randolph, 494 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Haven broadens
the emergency exception to conditions which are "life threatening" in the short run.
71. 464 F.2d at 788.
72. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
19801
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
grievous harms, even though the probability of occurrence is
minute. And use of a linear continuous model to deliberate on one
issue (e.g., materiality) need not require the use of that model for
other issues (e.g., negligence). Applying Learned Hand's methods
often will explain a case and dissipate precedential anomalies. The
methods are valuable in a broad range of non-extreme variables or
pairs of variables. As a first step, the District of Columbia cases use
the bivariate algebra of materiality. This calculation would be more
precise were it recognized as a means of determining the basic
elements of materiality or the standard of disclosure, instead of be-
ing treated as an isolated rule of decision or as a matter of "duty."
For example, the stages of analysis will multiply unnecessarily if ex-
treme unlikelihood of occurrence is coupled with non-severity of a
risk to constitute a special defense providing relief from an other-
wise existing duty to disclose.
Unneeded complexity arose when a federal district court read
the Tennessee precedents to create a cause of action following the
medical model and directed a verdict for the defendant; all medical
witnesses testified that it was not the local practice to warn pa-
tients of the risk of contracting hepatitis from blood received in
transfusion. The court of appeals73 affirmed but construed the prece-
dents to create a tort that does not turn on medical practice. With-
out using the term "materiality," the opinion specifies 4 that the test
involves likelihood and severity, but the decision does not explain
how to integrate the two variables. The case implies, however, that
the product of the two is the variable to be measured. No guide or
standard of comparison is given but, by affirming the directed ver-
dict, the decision suggests that the value of the severity-times-likeli-
hood product sometimes may fall so low that the issue is to be
resolved by the judge, not the jury. The opinion notes that hepatitis
is "not necessarily fatal" and "frequently responds to treatment."7
This language indicates that the continuous bivariate model of
materiality applies and that severity is not preemptive. But these
conclusions directly contradict Longmire v. Hoey, 6 the federal
court's principal precedent. The Tennessee Appellate Court in
Longmire stated" that the factor of severity is "paramount" to any
"percentage figures of occurrence."
The federal court also cited Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chemical
73. Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 1106-07.
75. Id. at 1107.
76. 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974).
77. Id. at 310.
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Works,78 which suggests a medical negligence model and recognizes
a narrow therapeutic privilege to withhold information to avoid
upsetting the patient, but only when the risk is "remote."79 The
opinion conversely stipulates that where the consequences are
serious and substantially certain to occur, the doctor has a duty to
disclose the risk despite a danger of upsetting the patient; apparently,
disclosure is an obligation independent of medical custom. Ball sug-
gests a rule of law, appropriate to the function of the judge and not
the jury, in instances where both materiality variables are elevated.
The federal opinion applies a converse rule of law when the
materiality is very low, even though severity or likelihood of the
risk is high. The rule favoring plaintiffs in Ball is weak authority for
the converse rule which benefits defendants in Sawyer. The error of
the federal court opinion is its concentration on Ball in discussing
"remote" risks. In Ball, the concept of remote risks limits the
therapeutic privilege to withhold information to those risks that are
remote; the concept is not an invitation to the courts to direct ver-
dicts for defendants in the case of remote risks. The notion restricts
defenses and does not define the minimum likelihood a plaintiff must
show in a particular case.
Misconstruing Ball and contradicting Longmire, Sawyer fails
adequately to consider another Tennessee case. After Ball, but
before Longmire and Sawyer, came Hastings v. Huges, ° in which a
doctor did not advise the patient of the risk of a broken tooth when
the patient bit an anesthesia tube during back surgery. The court
ruled that, absent warning of the risk, the defendant's common risk
defense must go to the jury and that the plaintiff need not produce
expert testimony on the informed consent issue to reach the jury.
Examined together, Ball, Hastings, and Longmire create a tort
following the misrepresentation model that requires proof of at least
minimal objective materiality by consideration of the product of
severity and likelihood; however, disproportionate weight is given to
severity in instances of grievous side effects. Tennessee physicians
probably can assert an affirmative defense of medical practice not to
disclose a remote risk whose disclosure is likely to upset the patient,
even though the patient risks a very serious side effect. This con-
struction not only reconciles the Tennessee decisions but renders
them consistent with the federal case. Sawyer is reconcilable, since
the record showed that Mrs. Sawyer had had emotional problems
and might have reacted adversely to disclosure. Medical practice
78. 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964).
79. 53 Tenn. App. at 225, 381 S.W.2d at 567.
80. 59 Tenn. App. 98, 438 S.W.2d 349 (1968).
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was not to disclose the risk because, though serious, it was remote.
Sawyer treats the doctor's discretion and the patient's mental condi-
tion as mere makeweights whereas, together with remoteness and
despite severity, they are genuine justifications for a directed ver-
dict for the defendant. The court should have stated as its rationale
such matters of special defense.
Materiality as a Standard
The element of materiality may be recast into a standards ele-
ment. A Wisconsin court in Trogun v. Fruchtman81 did so by adop-
ting a misrepresentation model by not requiring proof of medical
practice as evidence of the standard of disclosure. The court stated
that the standard of disclosure is whether the anticipated effect of
disclosure on the patient's decision is significant. This test is
equivalent to objective materiality. The source of the standard is
the community of patients. Trogun requires proof of objective
materiality and seemingly appreciates the difference between
materiality and scienter." A similar case is Joy v. Chau,8 which
follows a misrepresentation model and requires the element of ob-
jective materiality. By requiring "reasonable disclosure" of
'material" facts,"4 the opinion is sounds like a discussion of stan-
dards. The misrepresentation model requiring objective materiality,
but not explicitly imposing the element of actual subjective reliance,
is the model most often used.
Confusion about the measure of materiality and the source of
standards of disclosure arose in an Oregon opinion, Getchell v.
Mansfield," in which the court dismissed a suit because the plaintiff
failed to present expert testimony about the existence of feasible
alternatives and the materiality of the information withheld. The
Getchell court insisted on manipulating the "duty" concept when
speaking of the standard of conduct (disclosure) and the question of
81. 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973).
82. 58 Wis. at 604, 207 N.W.2d at 315. The case articulated the difference between
technical battery and the new tort by noting that the new tort does not deal with
touching or intent to touch without consent.
83. 377 N.E.2d 670, 676-77 (1978). The court stated that the duty to make
reasonable disclosure arises and must be imposed as a matter of law. The court seem-
ingly was of the view that choosing among competing models was unnecessary because
the charge to the jury, fairly construed, tended toward the rule more stringently en-
forcing disclosure, but nevertheless the jury found for the defendant.
84. Other misrepresentation model cases, requiring proof of objective materiality,'
include Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp. 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975), and Fogal v.
Genesee Hosp., 41 A.D.2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973) (prior to New York legislation
on informed consent).
85. 260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).
[Vol. 41
DISCLOSURE BY PHYSICIANS
breach. The opinion contradicts itself by stipulating that the ex-
istence of a duty is a "question of law" but also by concluding that
the content of the "duty" depends on the particular circumstances.
Still, the policy of the opinion is clear. The misrepresentation model
is adopted; the decision does not require proof of deviation from
medical customs of disclosure, but encourages expert testimony on
the question of materiality. In the calculus of materiality, Getchell
adds to severity and likelihood the variable of feasibility of alter-
natives. Since Oregon decidedly rejects the malpractice model," the
intended source of the standards of disclosure is the patient popula-
tion; medical testimony about materiality is relevant only to
establish underlying scientific and statistical bases.
In a sense, requiring proof of objective materiality as an element
is like requiring proof of the standards of disclosure of ordinary peo-
ple dealing with the important matter of their own persons. Proof of
standards of disclosure is not usually enumerated as an element of
deceit not because it is not required but because such an element
would be redundant. Taking this argument one step further, one
could say that if a jurisdiction requires proof of subjective reliance
as an element of the plaintiff's case in an informed consent suit but
does not require a plaintiff to prove either objective materiality or
the standards of disclosure among physicians, then the source of the
standards of disclosure is the plaintiff himself. This deduction,
however, leads to absurdity. Subjective reliance has significance in-
dependent from materiality and from standards of disclosure, as
usually conceived. Standards as a separate category is most mean-
ingful in the negligence model, while objective materiality is most
significant in the misrepresentation model; subjective reliance is
significant in both models. Louisiana apparently is one misrepresen-
tation model state that requires proof of both objective materiality
and subjective reliance. 7 However, one case8" adopts an objective
rule. A jurisdiction requiring a plaintiff to prove subjective reliance,
but not an element of objective materiality, presents an interesting
contrast.
Immateriality as a Defense
In a jurisdiction that follows the misrepresentation model or a
malpractice model but does not require the plaintiff to prove objec-
86. See Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 522 Or. 208, 522 P.2d 208 (1974).
87. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 294 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974); Zachary v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971).
88. Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977).
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tive materiality, an issue arises as to whether the defendant can in-
terpose objective immateriality as an affirmative defense. Though
that defense is not recognized expressly, inarticulate authority pro-
vides support in some cases which rule that a defendant does not
have a duty to inform the patient of slight risks of non-serious in-
jury. Such cases may be emphasizing materiality, though unwilling
to impose it as a necessary element of the plaintiff's case. Also, the
legislature of one American jurisdiction in effect made objective im-
materiality an affirmative defense." Just as plaintiffs use analogies
to build theories of claims, defendants must be creative in analogiz-
ing to establish defenses.
Information is material if a prudent man would consider it.
Knowledge of a fact should be distinguished from possible con-
templation of it by an ordinary person. No special defense of com-
mon knowledge need arise if the only obligation is not to deceive or
not actively to conceal; failure to disclose a well-known fact is not
concealment, much less misrepresentation. But if there is a duty of
affirmative disclosure, a common knowledge defense is logical,
whether the model is negligence or deceit. However, what is com-
mon knowledge for some persons may be a mystery to others. Thus,
commonality in a particular case depends partially on the patient's
knowledge and ability. In Bush v. St. Paul Ins. Co.9 ° a Louisiana
court held that the disclosure made to an "intelligent" woman con-
stituted full disclosure. Some courts will not assume knowledge of
even the commonplace risk of infection following surgery by persons
other than "well-educated patients."'" But in a malpractice model
jurisdiction, the fact that a risk is commonly recognized may enter
the case, not as a separate defense, but as an aspect of medical
custom because the commonplace apprehension of a risk influences
medical behavior in disclosing it.92
One court defined the common knowledge defense as an affir-
mative defense for the doctor to raise and accepted expert testi-
mony and other evidence of objective materiality as relevant.93 Com-
89. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(c) (1977).
90. 264 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
91. Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975). Distinctions of this
sort parallel the securities cases which state that the affirmative obligation to disclose
fully dissolves when the defendant deals with investors who can fend for themselves.
92. Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963). Michigan follows the
malpractice model and requires expert testimony on the medical practice of disclosure
or nondisclosure of a risk. See, e.g., Miles v. Van Gelder, 1 Mich. App. 522, 137 N.W.2d
292 (1965).
93. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972), follows the misrepresen-
tation model and requires proof only of subjective reliance and not of objective
materiality.
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mon knowledge and objective immateriality seemingly are probative
of the credibility of the plaintiff in testifying to ignorance and sub-
jective reliance, respectively. As a result, the court and jury are not
bound by such testimony, though it be contradicted by circumstan-
tial evidence only. A special excuse from the disclosure of commonly
known risks differs from non-imposition of the duty to disclose
remote risks or risks of little consequence. The latter two defenses
touch upon objective materiality and may not be special rules, but
just extreme instances of the independent variables in the calculus
of risks. All three excuses may co-exist." Relevant here is the ruling
in a New Jersey case: even when the defendant breaches some stan-
dard, there is no cause for action if the patient knew the risk in ad-
vance by discovering it from another source."5
The Pure Malpractice ModeL" Duty, Standards, and
the Difference Between Them
Medical Standards and Expert Testimony
Many cases since Salgo are infected with its deceit overtones;
frequently, other cases utilize battery analogies. In Kenny v.
Lockwood,"' a Canadian case, the court declared that the physician.
had an obligation to "exercise skill" in giving and withholding advice
and information. The relationship creating the obligation, ie., the
source of the duty, is the relationship of the ill person and the skilled
care provider. The court refused to characterize the relationship as
fiduciary and thoroughly rejected any preconceived policy favoring
full disclosure. The source of the standard of disclosure, though ulti-
mately a matter for legislation or judicial policy, is more immediately
the medical profession. The members of the profession must conform
to the minimum standards of the profession but need not give more
information than minimally competent advisors provide. Under Ken-
ny the discretion of doctors is broad; if the professional standards
are contested, a plaintiff in Ontario must prove them by expert
testimony.
The requirement of expert testimony to establish, not only
physiological processes and biomedical statistics, but also medical
customs of disclosure, is the badge of the malpractice theory,
despite consumerist language in opinions.
For example, Massachusetts is a consumer-oriented common-
94. See Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579 (N.D. 1979) (malpractice model; objective
materiality).
95. Fleishman v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 94 N.J. Super. 90, 226 A.2d 843 (1967).
96. [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507.
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wealth and the language of its informed consent decision97 reflects
the sentiment. The opinion requires expert testimony on causal and
scientific questions and views the special nature of the relationship
of trust between patient and doctor as the source of the obligation
of extensive disclosure. Yet the opinion notes that the discovery of
the standard of disclosure requires reference to medical practice.
This condition usually will require expert testimony on that issue.
Ultimately, Massachusetts uses the malpractice model.
Therapeutic Privilege
Besides requiring expert testimony on standards, the Canadian
case provides that physicians occasionally have a priv'ilege to con-
ceal information in order to induce the patient to take a course of
treatment he might otherwise refuse. This privilege in malpractice
jurisdictions is broad but not unqualified.
Ignoring special problems of psychiatry and outright mis-
representation, the privilege to withhold information is qualified by
the principle of necessity. The qualification may be weak or strong.
An example of a nearly unqualified privilege is Roberts v. Wood,"
involving Alabama law. The case adopts the malpractice model and
does not explore reliance or materiality. After a bench trial, the
judge ruled for a surgeon who had removed the thyroid of the plain-
tiff without mentioning the high risk of voice loss which increases in
a second operation. The surgeon testified that the plaintiff was "anx-
ious" about other matters (unrelated surgery) and that the explana-
tion of the risk might be too technical for her to understand. The
judge excused the nondisclosure for those reasons. Since the ex-
planation of this risk is relatively simple and since most surgical pa-
tients have some anxiety, the judge allowed a nearly unqualified
privilege.
Another broad privilege is suggested in apparent dicta in a
Texas case." The minimum standard of disclosure appears to require
advising a patient who has expressed fear of stroke only that an
angiogram is the most extensive test the patient will experience and
involves great risks. However, the record indicates that the doctor
also noted clearly the risk of stroke to the patient.
A third case suggesting a close qualification but allowing a
broad privilege is Nishi v. Hartwell,100 which follows Salgo v. Leland
97. Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962).
98. 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
99. Stinnett v. Price, 446 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
100. 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).
[Vol. 41
DISCLOSURE BY PHYSICIANS
Stanford Jr. University. The opinion in Nishi creates a malpractice
tort for instances in which a doctor does not adequately balance the
interests of the patient. The interests are knowledge and self-
determination on one side, and the avoidance of patient trauma and
the need for treatment on the other. The opinion specifies that if
treatment is obviously necessary and risks are minimal, the doctor
may withhold information. An aortographic procedure in Nishi led to
the loss of bowel control in the patient. Testimony established a
custom not to warn of that risk. The fact that the patient was a den-
tist has interesting ramifications. On one hand, he was in a better
position to ask for information; on the other, he was a person in
whom the chance of irrational refusal was so small that his right to
information should be honored. Hawaii law, emphasizing avoiding
refusal of needed treatment, is paternalistic in affording a wide
therapeutic privilege."' This attitude means that a theory of reliance
is irrelevant.
A jurisdiction which makes the privilege an affirmative defense
tends also to construe the privilege narrowly. Thus, the hybrid
jurisdictions exhibit a narrower privilege. 0' Neither a pure deceit
model or a battery model recognizes the privilege, nor may courts in
a fictional battery jurisdiction be expected to create any but the
narrowest privilege. However, the privilege presents special prob-
lems in cases involving a two-pronged tort.
Because later cases and legislation"'3 seem to have placed
Arizona into the malpractice camp, Arizona is not in the two-
pronged tort group. But Shetter v. Rochelle"' earlier held that a
physician must explain the essential hazards to obtain actual con-
sent and to avoid battery and that the obligation to reveal more
than those risks is measured by the tort of negligence. Shetter also
holds that a doctor has a broad therapeutic privilege to withhold in-
formation if revelation might evoke an unfavorable psychosomatic
response.
The privilege is particularly troublesome if extended to even the
essentials which might evoke an unfortunate response. A court
could qualify the privilege more narrowly for essential hazards than
for serious, yet non-essential, risks. The choice to distinguish privi-
101. Some jurisdictions that follow a malpractice model and appear to afford the
doctor a wide discretion are Virginia, see, e.g., Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976),
Texas, see, e.g., Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1965), and Delaware, see,
e.g., Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
102. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
103. See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
104. 2 Ariz. App. 358, 369-70, 409 P.2d 74, 85-86 (1965).
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leges arising under different facts should be exercised by legislative
reasoning. Fine analysis about the relative qualifications of privilege
on different points of a two-pronged tort identifies alternatives and
avoids inadvertent enactment of a broader privilege than intended.
Media of Disclosure
Full disclosure and a privilege to withhold are quantitative no-
tions of information. The vehicle of disclosure rarely is examined,
except to note that written forms using undefined terms are ineffec-
tive. In a pure malpractice jurisdiction the adequacy of the means of
warning also would be determined by reference to medical stan-
dards. Dicta in two malpractice informed consent cases suggest that
the standards for the media of disclosure are medical. In Grosjean 7).
Spencer,"°5 a patient had died of peritonitis after intestinal surgery.
The testimony showed that the disease was a leading cause of death
in surgery wards. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the
defendant, who had used a drawing"'6 to describe the disconnection
and reconnection of the intestines. The physician had warned about
leakage of gastric juices, a statement from which a risk of inflamma-
tion could be inferred. However, he did not caution expressly about
peritonitis. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to prove a
medical practice to warn of peritonitis. However, language em-
phasizing the physician's choice of how to discharge his duty,"7
coupled with the evidence of the drawing and the warning about
leakage, suggests that the court will permit doctors to decide which
mixture of pictures, words, and other media is adequate. This ap-
proach departs from the usual claim that the construction of words
and other expressions and the determination of the adequacy of
notices, memoranda of bargains, and written warnings are functions
of the trial judge.
Other dicta about the media of disclosure are found in Goven v.
Hunter.' That case affirmed a directed verdict against the plaintiff
who complained that the surgeon made six incisions, rather than the
two promised, on her right leg to strip varicose veins. Since the
health of the plaintiff was indisputably improved and the surgery
proceeded well, the case in effect was a battery claim for the four
extra scars. However, the court and counsel approached the case as
one of informed consent, and the court adopted a malpractice model
expressly requiring only subjective reliance. The proof failed
105. 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966).
106. 258 Iowa at 687-88, 140 N.W.2d at 141.
107. 258 Iowa at 694, 140 N.W.2d at 145.
108. 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
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because the plaintiff admitted she would have had the operation
even if the surgeon had not mentioned a maximum number of inci-
sions. ' 9 The opinion also discusses the credibility of testimony about
the conversation before surgery and whether a maximum number of
two scars was discussed. The court noted that the manner in which
a surgeon should discharge an obligation to warn is a question of
professionally competent practice. The record indicated that the
plaintiff had undergone prior varicose vein surgery and that she had
discussed the problem at least twice with one doctor who brought in
a second physician to assist him. The latter doctor visited the plain-
tiff on the eve of surgery to examine externally the course of the
vein. Without manipulating the duty concept or denying a primary
relationship between the plaintiff and the second doctor, the court
implied that it was reasonable for the defendant to rely on the first
physician for warnings. These facts intimate that the division of
labor between the surgeon and the referring physician and the
modes of disclosure of surgical risks are choices for doctors to make;
expressive techniques such as reminding a patient of past episodes
and using a physical examination to reveal the scope of the pro-
cedures and risks can fulfill medical standards of disclosure. How-
ever, this conclusion derives from dicta, because the medical
evidence in the case showed that surgeons cannot and do not predict
or disclose how many incisions they will make in varicose vein
operations. In pure malpractice theory the minimally competent
physician determines not only the content, but the medium of com-
munication and often is privileged not to communicate at all.
This "privilege" is not an unmitigated boon to doctors. If the
obligation is to use skill in disclosing and withholding information,
liability may exist not only for withholding information but also for
disclosure which creates harm. "
Affirmative Defenses
The use of the word "privilege" in this context is misleading.
The privilege in Kenny is not merely a defense or immunity or
justification which the physician may assert affirmatively. Rather,
the absence of the therapeutic reason or custom must be proved by
the plaintiff. The privilege is not a bar but a no-claim rule.
Duty, Standards, Breach, and Fulfillment
Use of the concept of "duty" as an analytical or policy-creating
109. Id. at 423.
110. See Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 10-11, 379 P.2d 292, 294 (1963).
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device is modern."' The term is a shorthand way of describing rela-
tionships and is employed in discussions of the problem of the un-
foreseen victim."2 But patients and doctors, though no longer well
acquainted, are not strangers. A designation of the persons to whom
a doctor owes professional obligations is easy. A few cases present
real questions of duty (e.g., referral to another doctor, resignation
from a case, membership on a team headed by one physician). But
most cases manipulate the "duty" concept too much, diluting its
discriminating force."' Only the misuse of the concept of "proximate
cause" exceeds the misapplication of the notion of "duty" by courts
dealing with claims of failure to obtain informed consent. The opin-
ions discussing "duty" intend to address actual or constructive
knowledge of a risk (scienter) or to inquire about the standards of
conduct or of disclosure. Duty is rarely a true issue; usually the
issue is breach. The basic component of the breach issue is a battle
of credibility over the doctor's representations and omissions. These
battles are not too frequent; the question of breach often devolves
into the question of the materiality of the disclosures made and
withheld. The doctor must be conscientious about giving advice and
withholding it. "Duty" is thus a spurious issue, since the real issue
is the standard by which to judge the disclosure." '
One genuine duty issue is hospital liability. No case has awarded
judgment against a hospital or defined any duty of a hospital to pro-
vide information. The reasons may be that (1) the institutional rela-
tionship of the hospital and the patient does not contemplate a
dialogue about the risks, or (2) the relationship of doctor and patient
intervenes and dominates in such matters. '
Hospitals may volunteer to exceed the requirements of
disclosure imposed by law. One author suggests that a hospital
111. W. PROSSER, supra note 55, at § 166.
112. Dean Prosser called the problem "the unforeseen victim." Id. at §§ 168-69.
113. Id. at §§ 167-68.
114. But see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at § 1058 (defense of the
"relative duty" device).
115. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d (Wisc. 1975). But con-
sider dicta in Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 418, 227 N.E.2d 296, 301, 280
N.Y.S.2d 373, 381 (1967), about the duty of a hospital to prevent a surgeon from per-
forming surgery which is illegal or fraudulent and dicta in Ohilgschlager v. Proctor
Memorial Hosp., 6 Ill. App. 3d 81 (1972). Also reflect upon the atypical situation in
which the physicians obliged to inform a patient are servants of the hospital as in
ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). Finally, compare the dif-
ferent rationales of Justice Cardozo for acquitting hospitals of vicarious liability for
negligence and battery of physicians and the role of communications between the pa-
tient and the nurses in Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.
92, 133 N.Y.S. 1143 (1914).
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which disseminates the 1972 Patients' Bill of Rights of the American
Hospital Association will volunteer itself as a surety of physicians. " 6
The American Hospital Association is producing audio-visual public
relations materials explaining rights to patients. If the intent is to
avoid liability by inducing patients to ask more questions, to assume
more risks, and to seek more answers from physicians, the effort is
doomed not only to fail, as ethically it should, but also to divest
hospitals of an immunity they presently enjoy. On the other hand, if
the motives of the hospitals are humanitarian and self-critical, then
the courts should be more charitable in deciding the legal effect of
information volunteered by hospitals and expressed in powerfully
suggestive media which will induce reliance in ailing persons. But
the ancient proviso is that one who volunteers even with kind
motives must perform well; negligent, gratuitous efforts to prevent
harm or to rescue are better not performed, since they may
foreclose successful efforts by a more prudent volunteer. " 7
The "duty" issue again arose in Bell v. Umstattd;..8 the court ap-
plied a "captain of the ship" rule to surgical teams and excused an
anesthesiologist from the duty of procuring informed consent,
holding the surgeon in charge answerable. A Kansas case in point is
Stovall v. Harms."9 The court ruled that if one doctor refers a pa-
tient to a specialist, the specialist should inform the person about
special treatments. In this situation use of the "duty" concept is
analytically precise because the essence of the case is the extent of
each of the doctor-patient relationships. Another referral case was
Pegram v. Sisco,"' in which the judge awarded damages to the plain-
tiff in a bench trial. Two medical specialists testified that the infor-
mation given by the specialist defendant was inadequate as
measured by local medical standards and that specialists did not
assume that their patients had been briefed on risks by the refer-
ring physician.121
Variations in plaintiffs also produce differences in the duty owed.
The scope of the treating relationship often extends to the unborn.
Under a New York decision,"' an infant who during delivery suffers
116. See Comment, Patients' Rights and Informed Consent: An Emergency Case
for Hospitals, 12 CALIF. W.L. REV. 406 (1976) (reproducing the patient's "Bill of
Rights").
117. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963).
118. 401 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
119. 214 Kan. 835, 522 P.2d 353 (1974).
120. 406 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Ark. 1976).
121. The federal court heard the case by means of diversity jurisdiction; Arkansas
state law governed. However, the court lacked precedents to guide it.
122. Shack v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1976).
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an injury which is a side effect of the delivery method may sue; the
doctor who selected that method is liable if he does not advise the
mother of alternative methods and of the risks of each to the baby.
Stated differently, infants hurt during delivery have standing to sue
for want of informed consent by their mothers.
Delegation of Law Making and the Reserved Power of Courts
Although either the community at large or the law is the im-
mediate source in a consumer misrepresentation or deceit model,
the medical profession is the direct source in jurisdictions which
follow a malpractice model. The later jurisdictions delegate a great
deal of policymaking to the medical profession, while reserving
power to the courts to change the model should the medical profes-
sion fail to produce a good standard. An element of paternalism in-
herent in this delegation suggests the possibility of privileged lying.
However, such jurisdictions do not go that far. For example, the
practice among psychiatrists in England is to reveal nothing to pa-
tients about the risks of fracture and other severe injury from elec-
troshock, to encourage the treatment if it is indicated, and to
answer only a patient's direct questions. That practice passes judi-
cial scrutiny in malpractice model jurisdictions,'23 but the courts
clearly should frown upon plain lying.
A New Mexico case which follows a malpractice model with a
potentially enormous therapeutic privilege is an exception. In an
electroshock case, Woods v. Brunlop,"' the court stated that a doc-
tor is free to withhold information if he believes the patient unwisely
might refuse treatment on account of a minimal risk or if the doctor
believes that the disclosure would produce apprehension interfering
with therapy. The implication is that the plaintiff must present ex-
pert testimony to establish medical standards of disclosure. How-
ever, the alleged facts in Woods were extraordinary. The jury found
for the plaintiff, who had sued a psychiatrist who recommended elec-
troshock but did not herself administer the therapy.'25 At the trial,
the testimony of the two parties collided.' The patient claimed to
have asked if the therapy could cause harm and alleged that the
defendant had lied by saying bluntly that it was a very safe treat-
ment. The plaintiff asserted a fracture and a hearing loss as side ef-
fects. The trial court submitted those effects as possible elements of
loss to the jury. But, the record showed that the plaintiff had been
123. Bolan v. Friern Hosp., [1957] 2 ALL E.R. 118.
124. 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
125. 71 N.M. at 222-23, 377 P.2d at 521.
126. 71 N.M. at 227, 377 P.2d at 524.
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losing her hearing before the shock, and the defense disputed causa-
tion."' 7 Even the expert witness called by the plaintiff was unwilling
to express a firm opinion about shock as a cause of hearing loss. The
error in submitting that element to the jury compelled a new trial.
The informed consent dicta are noteworthy. The opinion stipulates
that the decision to impose liability for giving false answers to the
questions of a patient should be made by asking the same questions
about the therapeutic benefits of treatment and about disclosure
asked by the court in evaluating silence or nondisclosure by a psy-
chiatrist.'28 The opinion states that therapeutic intent may justify a
lie, but adds that the defendant had not raised an intent defense un-
til after trial;"9 rather, the physician testified that she had warned the
patient of various risks. The patient testified to her subjective
reliance: she would not have undertaken shock treatment had she
known the risks.' The opinion seems satisfied with this argument
without positing an objective materiality element. In future litiga-
tion, New Mexico probably will not tolerate proven instances of ac-
tual deception by doctors. The suggestions in the Woods dicta are
paternalistic attempts to justify the misrepresentation that histo-
rically has exploited incompetents. Although the model is negli-
gence, an entire industry or profession cannot be permitted to set
its own uncontrolled standards."' That prohibition ought to apply
perhaps more emphatically"' to psychiatrists than to any others.
The extent to which jurisdictions delegate standard-setting
varies. Some jurisdictions have nearly immunized physicians and
place substantial trust in the medical profession by delegating
broadly, optimistic that self-regulation will enforce full disclosure. If
hopes are often disappointed, the law intervenes. A jurisdiction in
point is North Carolina, which recognized the new tort but greatly
restricted it."'
127. 71 N.M. at 223, 377 P.2d at 522.
128. 71 N.M. at 227, 377 P.2d at 524.
129. 71 N.M. at 229, 377 P.2d at 525.
130. 71 N.M. at 227, 377 P.2d at 524.
131. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). See
W. PROSSER, supra note 55, at § 136.
132. Compare the dicta in Woods with Bolan v. Friern Hosp., [1957] 2 ALL E.R.
118. Both the English courts and the British psychiatric profession draw the line at ly-
ing. The posture of the record in Woods does not reveal how New Mexico's prac-
tioners act.
133. North Carolina recognized a "duty" of sorts to inform patients, but the stan-
dard of disclosure was met easily. The court began by recognizing virtually no obliga-
tion in Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955). In Hunt, a surgeon
characterized an operation as simple; it was not. During the course of the operation,
the patient suffered a collateral injury when the doctor attempted to remove a piece of
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North Carolina may have been evolving the two-pronged tort, in
which general warning suffices to deflect only the misrepresentation
prong; the plaintiff is allowed to assert malpractice by using expert
testimony to establish a deviation from good medical practice. But
the cases indicate further movement in North Carolina toward a
malpractice model encompassing nearly all cases with a relaxed
standard, a broad therapeutic privilege, an element of objective
materiality, and little room for distinction between total non-
disclosure and partial nondisclosure.
A contemporary case of the Starnes line is Koury v. Fallo, '34
which illustrates that even in a jurisdiction like North Carolina,
there are limits to the delegation of standard-making to a profes-
sional community; the North Carolina judges reserve the power to
disregard a custom that does not serve citizens. In Koury the
defendant prescribed medicine whose benefit was far outweighed by
the risk of deafness. The court found that the failure to disclose the
risk violated the standard of disclosure, despite the low frequency of
the side effect and regardless of the uncontradicted medical
testimony that doctors do not disclose the risk. However, the real
basis of liability was not the failure to warn but the negligence in
prescribing the particular drug. Whether prescription or conceal-
ment is the implicated behavior, the technique used to evaluate the
culpability of the conduct is the three-variable formula of Judge
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,"3 5 applied with no more
apology to custom than Hand himself expressed in T.J. Hooper.3 '
Materiality and Reliance as Elements in a
Tort Modelled on Negligence
A jurisdiction's requirement of proof of subjective reliance as an
element of an informed consent suit is compatible with a pure
malpractice model. The addition of objective materiality con-
taminates the pure malpractice model, because litigation of the
materiality of information is characteristic of deceit cases; the
materiality issue implies a standard of disclosure which views the
community at large as the source of the standard. This concept com-
petes with the central feature of the malpractice model-the loca-
tion of the source of standards of disclosure in the medical profes-
steel accidently lodged in plaintiffs chest. Hunt states that the surgeon's characteriza-
tion of the operation was mistaken but not negligent. Standards found in later cases
were only a little more demanding. See, e.g., Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158
S.E.2d 339 (1968); Watson v. Clutts, 266 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
134. 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
135. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
136. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
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sion and not the community at large. In the pure malpractice model
the average patient's interest in information is evaluated by the doc-
tor as a part of his professional judgment and conduct.
But informed consent cases applying a malpractice model are
tinged with misrepresentation. An example is the Delaware "rare
hazard defense"; the state uses the malpractice model and favors a
subjective reliance concept tempered by the objective provision that
a doctor need not inform patients of risks which are very "uncom-
mon." 7 Like other issues in informed consent cases, the rare hazard
exception is analyzed in terms of the duty of the defendant rather
than in terms of breach of standards or of objective materiality (as
distinguished from actual reliance). The reason for the creation of
such complexities is difficult to ascertain. The disutility of an uncom-
mon hazard defense is illustrated by a record showing uniform
medical practice to warn of a very rare risk when the motive for
disclosure is a conviction that the admonition will help the cure,
perhaps by impressing the patient with the importance of his
cooperation. A jurisdiction otherwise serious about the malpractice
model probably would not excuse nondisclosure by applying the un-
common risk defense.
The standards element swallows materiality and its components
in a pure malpractice approach, but even a pure negligence model
does not destroy the distinct significance of actual subjective
reliance. At least two jurisdictions follow the malpractice model and
require that the plaintiff prove both subjective reliance and objec-
tive materiality. Those jurisdictions are Massachusetts'38 and Illinois.
Illinois in Green v. Hussey"9 acknowledged a new tort and
fashioned it to favor heavily the defendant. In Green, the court
adopted a malpractice model and, consistent with that, required ex-
pert testimony about custom to establish standards of disclosure.
The opinion does not deal directly with reliance but suggests a con-
cept of objective materiality. Miceikis v. Field' seems to state that
materiality is an objective construct and requires expert
testimony.' One notion possibly advanced by the case is that doc-
tors know what information is important to ordinary, reasonable pa-
tients and that the courts must recognize the benefit of physicians'
experience. An alternative interpretation of the case is that actual
patient reliance is irrelevant; self-determination is not a separate
137. Wagner v. Olmedo, 365 A.2d 643 (Del. 1976).
138. Schroeder v. Lawrence, 372 Mass. 1, 359 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (1977).
139. 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970).
140. 37 Ill. App. 3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320 (1976).
141. 37 Ill. App. 3d at 767-68, 347 N.E.2d at 324.
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end, but only a therapeutic resource to be manipulated skillfully by
the doctor. The former reading is probably more correct. First, the
latter interpretation would conflict with the values expressed in
Pratt.'42 Second, the opinion dwells at length on the existence of evi-
dence that the plaintiff "insisted" on the utilized medical alternative.
This fact allows defense lawyers to argue that state law requires proof
of both the objective materiality of withheld information and actual
subjective reliance upon the silence by the plaintiff.' 3 Both elements
may be required in a third jurisdiction which follows the malpractice
model. Missouri started with battery, 4' added misrepresentation,'45
and replaced that with the malpractice model. The court in Mitchell
v. Robinson4 ' rejected both the defense of emergency and the
defense of the plaintiff's incompetence to choose among treatments.
The court noted that the patient was mentally ill; however, he was
sufficiently rational to balance his mental health against his or-
thopedic well-being. The implication is that actual reliance, but not
objective materiality, is an element of the tort. The actual decision
of the ill plaintiff and not the supposed mentality of a reasonable,
healthy person, is the important factor.
Later, in Aiken v. Clary,'47 the court overruled Mitchell in
another insulin shock case and required expert testimony about both
medical practice and materiality. The opinion is extremely defense-
oriented. Aiken states that materiality is not what an average,
reasonable man would consider significant to his choice, but rather
what information or opportunity for choice a competent doctor
142. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Il. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
143. One other comment regarding Miceikis is useful. The court states that expert
testimony is usually required on the issue of causation-in-fact of the supposed side ef-
fect by the procedure. But the court carelessly uses the phrase "proximate result,"
which suggests proximate cause or a notion of limitation of liability for indirect or un-
foreseen consequences; surely the issue is really cause-in-fact.
Furthermore, the Illinois informed consent cases do not suggest abolition of the
technical battery tort, but the defense of implied consent usually makes that tort
unavailable in the medical field in all but the most outrageous cases.
144. In Steele v. Wood, 327 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1959), the court ruled for the plaintiff
on a battery model and did not invoke implied consent when the plaintiff proved that
defendant had not been fully informed that he would perform a hysterectomy. The in-
trusion per se was compensable.
145. In Mitchell v. Robinson, 343 S.W.2d 11 (1960), the court expressed the view
that one may recover from a doctor who obtains consent to electroshock without in-
forming the patient of the risk of fractures; the plaintiff need not present evidence of a
medical practice of advising patients. Plaintiff presented no expert testimony of any
kind. However, defendants testified that there were risks, that they knew about them,
and that they did advise the plaintiff. Thus, the gist of the case was credibility.
146. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
147. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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believes a patient should possess. The case notes that in Mitchell
the doctors implicitly conceded that large risks existed; since good
practice necessitated disclosure of the risks, the question of the
source of the standards was not presented. But in the process of
overruling Mitchell, the court did not suggest that a plaintiff who
admits that he imprudently would have undertaken the risks may
recover by proving that a prudent man would not have done so; the
tone of the reversal suggests otherwise. While Missouri adopted a
new model when the first proved uncongenial, other jurisdictions
have combined forms.
Hybrid Forms and Two-Pronged Torts
Any jurisdiction which recognizes a new tort fashioned by
analogy to deceit or misrepresentation provides a plaintiff two
theories for his suit as misrepresentation cumulates with negligence.
The plaintiff may seek to prove the physician's lack of skill in giving
advice on a pure malpractice model, employing expert testimony.
Thus, such jurisdictions have a two-pronged tort of failure to obtain
informed consent. In acknowledging a misrepresentational tort, a
court may choose to supplement only slightly the plaintiffs'
remedies and to leave most of the work to the tort of negligence.
Cases in Kansas, Florida, and Minnesota illustrate this alternative.
In Kansas the misrepresentational prong is short and blunt.
In the leading case of Natanson v. Kline,"8 the trial court
employed a consumer approach, by instructing that a doctor must
tell all known risks. The reviewing court placed the case nearer to a
malpractice model by opining that the doctor has some discretion.
The opinion holds that expert testimony usually is required to prove
medical custom and practice. The record showed that the doctor had
provided some information, but in dicta the court suggested that a
plaintiff need not produce expert testimony about custom if he proves
that the defendant gave no warnings. The decision also lets the doc-
tor affirmatively defend by proving that his withholding conformed to
accepted practice. This pattern of burden-shifting varies the
character of the tort in the defense context, but only in cases in
which the defendant gave no warning of all the risks. The court also
required the element of actual reliance, but inferred reliance from
the plaintiff's testimony and the pleadings, although they did not
claim reliance expressly." '
148. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1969).
149. A Washington decision, ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1
(1972), found for the plaintiff, despite his failure to state his reliance expressly.
Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963), represents a distinction between
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Kansas requires expert testimony or other scientific proof of the
existence and magnitude of alleged risks as a basis for proof of ac-
tual reliance.' Although maintaining vigilance in cases of total non-
disclosure and actual misrepresentation, Kansas is well imbued with
the logic of negligence.' Kansas courts now require objective
materiality152 in addition to subjective reliance.
Florida cases are either in conflict or present something like a
two-pronged tort. Florida acknowledged a cause of action on the con-
sumer disclosure model without excusing nondisclosure of the "com-
monly known" hazard of infection following surgery in Russell v.
Hardwick." The consumer metaphor was reinforced in Bowers v.
Talmage, 5' in which the failure to disclose a 30/0 risk of serious in-
jury as a breach of the duty to inform and the issue of subjective
reliance were treated as jury questions. These cases suggest that
the failure to warn even of remote hazards is a breach; the duty in-
cludes the obligation to disclose remote risks. The plaintiff need pre-
sent only sufficient expert testimony to establish the risk and its
magnitude; then he may testify that a risk of that size would
dissuade him from treatment. But, Ditlow v. Kaplan"' stated that a
doctor who advises a patient that a procedure is serious and "risky"
should be discharged, unless the plaintiff presents expert testimony
that the custom is to volunteer more detailed information. This
treatment suggests the distinction between total and partial non-
disclosure in Kansas case law. In Florida a strict fiduciary duty to
disclose risks of serious injury with a probability greater than 3%,
and a duty of professional care to disclose other risks when minimally
total nondisclosure and partial disclosure. The court formulated a moderately broad
therapeutic privilege; a doctor need not alarm his patient. Liability may follow if he
does. 191 Kan. at 8, 379 P.2d at 294.
150. Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967). Collins should be read in
light of Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205 (1974). Together they restate
and reinforce the two-tiered pattern. The hybrid employing an affirmative defense of
privilege exists only for those cases in which the plaintiff has proved that the defend-
ant mentioned no risks. When the defendant mentioned some of the more significant
risks, the plaintiff, to prevail, must prove that the disclosure did not conform to good
medical practice. Distinguished from the two-pronged tort, this is the two-tiered tort.
It affords a hybrid misrepresentational form to govern the most egregious records.
151. Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973).
152. 212 Kan. at 537, 512 P.2d at 550. An earlier Kansas case, declaring that there
is no duty to disclose slight risks, may be explained as introducing an element of objec-
tive materiality or constraining further the limited misrepresentational prong for total
nondisclosure. Yeates v. Harms, 194 Kan. 675, 393 P.2d 982 (1964).
153. 166 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
154. 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
155. 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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competent doctors would disclose them, may exist. This scheme
would constitute a two-pronged tort.
One prong is the legal obligation created by the law. The second
obligation is created by the medical profession with power delegated
by the courts. This idea of a cumulation of torts finds recent expres-
sion in Tetsone v. Adams.' A strict obligation to disclose all known
facts was held to arise from the confidential nature of the relation-
ship between doctor and patient. The Tetsone court also con-
templated the liability of physicians for active concealment of facts.
A state providing a new two-pronged tort while retaining battery
for proper instances is Minnesota. Minnesota is known for recogni-
tion of actual, technical battery in the medical context because of
Mohr v. Williams.'57 More recently, in Bang v. Charles T. Miller
Hospital,"' a surgeon successfully corrected the prostate problem of
a patient who consented generally to the operation. To prevent in-
fection, the defendant severed the sperm ducts without advising the
patient that the procedure usually is recommended to minimize post-
surgical infection. The court affirmed a money judgment for the
plaintiff. The computation of damages gave no suggestion of a
Waltz-Inbau credit for the cure the surgeon effected or the risk of
infection he avoided. The damages were for the intrusion itself; this
follows the battery mode. However, the opinion concludes that the
failure to warn of risks would be negligence, pointing toward a
malpractice model. But, in Cornfeldt v. Tongen,"9 the court sug-
gested a two-pronged tort by opining that a doctor's deviation from
medical standards is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for
liability for nondisclosure. This opinion may be no more than the
classic reservation by the courts of law-making power when a trade
to whom regulation has been delegated does not satisfy basic expec-
tations.
A two-pronged tort may be a stage of development toward the
full adoption of the misrepresentation model. Before legislation em-
braced a malpractice model, New York courts appeared to prefer
156. 373 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Accord, Brown v. Wood, 202 So.
2d 125 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
157. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
158. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
159. 262 N.W.2d 684 (1977). The opinion devotes separate attention to the scientific
element of physical cause and requires the plaintiff to prove it. As between subjective
reliance or objective materiality, the court suggests that either will suffice, but
"prefers" objective materiality. The court calls the reliance-materiality element the
causal element, which suggests that the real factor motivating the court is reliance.
The preference for proof of objective materiality is a fear of plaintiffs' perjury rather
than a substantive rule of disclosure. In addition, the court required proof of at least
constructive knowledge of the risk by the doctor.
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the consumer misrepresentation model' and did not require any ex-
pert testimony about medical practice. Barnette v. Potemza,"'6 a case
alleging total nondisclosure of a risk, announced a rule which argu-
ably excuses expert testimony only on the extreme end of non-
disclosure. However, Zeleznik v. Jewish Hospital 2 extended the
misrepresentation model to cover most cases.
Distinct from the notion of a two-pronged tort is that of a hybrid
tort generally excusing expert testimony on medical custom in the
plaintiffs case. This hybrid tort also makes available an affirmative
defense of conformity to medical custom and entitles the defendant
to judgment if the plaintiff does not contradict the evidence of con-
formity. The limited form of this tort is the Kansas two-tiered tort
or shifting presumption. A comprehensive version is found in Martin
v. Bralliar,3 which resisted defense arguments that the plaintiff is
excused from proving nonconformity to good medical practice only if
he pleads and proves failure to mention any risks.'"
Evolution toward the hybrid form is illustrated further by New
Jersey and Washington cases. The initial New Jersey position,
stated in Kaplan v. Haines,"5 was the malpractice model requiring
proof of subjective reliance. But a noticeable shift occurred in Lopez
v. Swyer,"' to a theory of misrepresentation by silence; that theory
allows the plaintiffs case to reach the jury without expert testi-
mony, as long as the existence, materialization in fact, and non-
disclosure of the risk are conceded or otherwise proved and subjec-
tive reliance is expressed. But the ruling was interlocutory, since
the decision merely reversed a summary judgment for the defend-
ant. More recently, New Jersey moved toward the hybrid model and
objective materiality in Calabrese v. Trenton State College,"7
holding that the breach of medical standards is not a required ele-
ment of the plaintiff's case, but conformity to standards is an affir-
160. Courts later interpreted legislation to require use of the malpractice model
and to impose liability only when its elements are fulfilled. See Shack v. Holland, 89
Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S. 988 (1976).
161. 79 Misc. 2d 51, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1974).
162. 47 A.D.2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975).
163. 36 Colo. App. 254, 540 P.2d 1118 (1975).
164. In Mallet v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970), the court formulated
the hybrid response to a record in which the plaintiff alleged no warning whatsoever.
The jurisdiction followed a subjective reliance element in Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo.
App. 357, 492 P.2d 862 (1971); but an objective materiality test was applied in
Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976). See also Niblock v. United
States, 438 F.Supp. 383 (D. Colo. 1977).
165. 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967).
166. 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
167. 162 N.J. Super. 142, 392 A.2d 600 (1978).
[Vol. 41
DISCLOSURE BY PHYSICIANS
mative defense. Objective materiality, defined as any fact that might
affect a patient's decision, is an element.
Finding a place for medical standards under a misrepresentation
model is illustrated best by Washington cases that have struggled
with how probative of materiality expert testimony may be.
At the outset Washington acknowledged that laymen can
recognize their needs for disclosure"8 and that a jury can ascertain
the standard of disclosure and apply it to a concrete case without
expert testimony.6 ' But the case recognized that a doctor is not
liable for failing to advise of a rare risk not foreseeable by physi-
cians; thus the question whether the doctor should have apprehended
the existence of the risk often requires expert testimony. Shifting
from the mental components of culpability (scienter, knowledge, and
constructive knowledge) to the element of patient deliberation, the
case offers an objective materiality rule in which expert testimony
is relevant but not controlling. The relevancy of expert testimony
utilized by the defense later evolved to an affirmative defense in
Miller v. Kennedy.7 '
Decided after Watkens and Mason but before Miller was
ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center,7' which affirmed a
large verdict for the plaintiff; however, in dicta ZeBarth retreats
from misrepresentation to the malpractice model and distinguishes
Mason v. Ellsworth as atypical."' But closer inspection indicates
that the court was not departing from the misrepresentation model'
The opinion held that the standard is the prevailing medical judg-
ment of the best disclosure for the patient. The court maintained
that the standard is disclosure of such information as the medical
community perceives that a patient of "ordinary understanding"
needs to "balance the possible risks against the possible benefits."'73
The hypothetical ordinary patient's need for information to balance
risk is the test. This conclusion contrasts with the pure malpractice
model, in which the doctor balances the interests. The decision
almost completely ignored the notion of a therapeutic privilege.17
The main discussion of expert medical testimony occurred in the
context of deliberation on the materiality of information to a
168. Watkins v. Parpalce, 2 Wash. App. 484, 469 P.2d 974 (1970).
169. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970).
170. 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974).
171. 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
172. Annot., Necessity and Sufficiency of Expert Evidence to Establish Existence
and Extent of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 52
A.L.R. 1067, 1078 (1973).
173. Id. at 1079.
174. Id. at 1077.
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layman, not in an examination of therapeutics. In short, materiality
is objective and usually requires testimony by doctors about how
typical patients make decisions. Yet even this reference to medical
experts was somewhat useless; the court remained disturbed by the
fact that "the plaintiff did not categorically state that, had he known
or been informed of the risks, he would not have accepted the treat-
ment.""17 The court inferred the plaintiff's subjective reliance from
his testimony. The final result requires both actual reliance (which is
presumed or readily inferred) and objective materiality (which re-
quires strict proof); an affirmative defense of objective immateriality
is available. Unfortunately, the judges referred to subjective
reliance as an issue of "proximate cause." Reliance may be viewed
as cause-in-fact, but reliance has nothing to do with the notion of
proximate cause, a misnomer for the limitation of liability.
ZeBarth's poor reasoning about informed consent is attributable
to the fact that malpractice in the administration of radiology treat-
ment and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were the main issues on
appeal. Also, the question of whether the plaintiff must produce ex-
pert testimony on an informed consent count was not presented; the
plaintiff had produced testimony from two doctors who agreed that
the risks in question are material to everyone who considers them
and that it is good practice to reveal the risks. An "exception" to
the need for expert testimony discussed by the opinion was also dicta.
The exception is "manifest duty." ' The court gives as an example
of manifest duty the obligation to disclose the risks of spinal x-ray
burns in the context of treatment for a non-malignant wart. This ex-
ample actually illustrates objective materiality of the risk. The ex-
ception to the expert testimony requirement is yet another indica-
tion that the misrepresentation model primarily motivates ZeBarth
and that proof of the medical standards of disclosure is not required.
Rather, the court seeks cogent evidence, such as expert testimony,
of objective materiality. The dissent called ZeBarth a "result
decree." As such, the decision supports the consumer model found in
the other Washington cases, coupled with an affirmative defense of
qualified privilege.
A Washington court in 1972 used the consumer misrepresenta-
tion model in a case in which the skin condition of a patient of orien-
tal background worsened after dermabrasion that had only a 50%
chance of success in oriental patients.177 The court stressed the pa-
tient's need to be aware of the risk and not the custom of disclosure
175. Id. at 1080.
176. Id. at 1076.
177. Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971).
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and withholding by doctors; the case does suggest that expert
testimony may be relevant to the need-to-know elements (objective
materiality) and may therefore be presented by either the plaintiff
or defendant.178 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed patterns of
the misrepresentation model that included objective materiality in
Miller v. Kennedy79 and Holt v. Nelson.8 ' The Miller case provides
therapeutic privilege as an affirmative defense. Thus, an informed
consent trial in Washington may begin as a deceit case but become a
malpractice trial after the plaintiff rests. 8'
One implication of an affirmative defense is that if cogent
evidence supporting it is introduced but not contradicted, the
defendant is entitled to judgment, just as the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment if he presents evidence to support all elements of his case
and the defendant rests without contradicting this evidence. But
sometimes courts declare that a jury is free to disregard a defend-
ant's evidence of a medical custom to withhold information.' 2
The language of Sard v. Hardy'88 resembles a skein of malprac-
tice and misrepresentation, with medical standards as an affirmative
defense. The court permitted the physician to introduce freely proof
of medical standards of disclosure, but said if the standards are not
conclusive, the jury may disregard them. The court called this evi-
dentiary benefit a qualified, narrow privilege, but did not establish
it as an affirmative defense. The opinion notes that the plaintiff's
case often will require expert testimony about the existence and
magnitude of risks and alternatives, as well as the detrimental
effects of materialized risks, but his presentation need not contain
expert testimony or other proof of professional standards of dis-
178. Hunter v. Brown, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1974).
179. 91 Wash. 2d 155, 588 P.2d 734 (1978).
180. 11 Wash. App. 230, 237, 523 P.2d 211, 216 (1974).
181. The Miller appellate court, in construing ZeBarth, reviewed the jury instruc-
tions and firmly settled on objective materiality, excusing proof of actual subjective
reliance. The supreme court adopted the appellate view as its own.
182. A strong statement of jury power to disregard defense evidence of
therapeutic need is Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). Since most mis-
representation model jurisdictions invite or allow defense evidence of medical custom
as relevant to an issue of therapeutic privilege, all partake of the hybrid model. This
writer has labeled as hybrids only those states in which the tenor of the cases indicate
that a therapeutic defense, supported by expert testimony and not rebutted or seriously
impeached by expert testimony, would entitle the defendant to a directed verdict. This
is the usual implication of an affirmative defense. However, no reported decision ar-
ticulating this implication has been found, although several cases, like Sard, appear to
articulate the contrary. Thus, despite frequent mention of privilege and defense, few
cases are, properly speaking, hybrids.
183. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
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closure.18" ' The meaning of the doctor's freedom to introduce proof of
medical standards on the trial of the general issue is uncertain. The
court posited a requirement of objective materiality, but confused it
with actual subjective reliance by calling objective materiality a
causal issue. The court may have suggested that the information
reasonable patients need tends to influence what reasonable physi-
cians provide. As a consequence, proof of the medical standards is
probative of the needs of reasonable patients. Incidentally, the opin-
ion specifically identifies as an element the actual or constructive
knowledge (scienter) of the doctor.
The hybrid form retains much of the malpractice model. The
main objections to the hybrid model are that professional biases
may produce weak standards and that a lack of consensus may abro-
gate all standards, so that the medical profession is unregulated."5
An additional practical objection is that the delegation of standards
to a profession and a requirement that the plaintiff produce expert
testimony about the standards renders all plaintiffs vulnerable to a
conspiracy of silence. An extreme response to such objections is the
fictional battery theory.
The Fictional Battery Model
The last model of interest is fictional battery. Technical battery
is actual battery, and the defendant must argue actual consent,
which may be implied from the circumstances. The only exception is
emergency treatment, in which the law itself implies consent.
Fictional battery is constructive battery. Liability may exist
despite the doctor's precise description of the organs he will touch,
the specific procedures to be used, and the tools and materials he
will utilize. Liability may attach even if a patient laboring under no
mental infirmity said expressly "I consent to that work with those
instruments upon those organs by that method." The liability non
obstante arises if the physician does not inform adequately of col-
lateral risks.
Ohio is the one jurisdiction that has created the fictional battery
tort to supplement a malpractice tort. In Belcher v. Carter"' a doc-
tor failed to warn the plaintiff of the risks of x-ray treatment. The
plaintiff sued in one count that appeared to confuse negligence and
battery. The trial court rejected the complaint and gave leave to
plead in two counts. The plaintiff refused to amend his original com-
184. 281 Md. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1023-24.
185. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
186. 130 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967).
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plaint, and the judge dismissed the case without prejudice. The ap-
pelate court affirmed, announcing that the facts alleged would sup-
port simultaneously negligence and battery counts. The two theories
should have been drafted separately, and the court gave the plaintiff
one year in which to refile.
Later, a published trial court opinion reinforced Belcher. In Con-
grove v. Holmes,1"7 the trial judge entered summary judgment for
the plaintiff in a case in which the doctor admitted that he had not
disclosed risks of a thyroidectomy. The opinion cites the famous
technical battery cases of Pratt, Mohr, and Schloendorff as authori-
ty. 8' The opinion excerpts depositions and interrogatory answers in
which the doctor voiced a therapeutic privilege defense, claiming his
withholding information was in the patient's best interests. The
court completely rejected the defense. The plaintiff tendered no af-
fidavits of expert testimony and expressed only her subjective
reliance on the physician's silence. The record established that vocal
chord injury is a substantial risk of thyroidectomy and had occurred
in the case. The court reasoned that specific proof of the magnitude
of the risk is not required, and, even more strikingly, said that the
element of causation may be reached on motion when the papers on
file show that the plaintiff's injury falls within the scope of the
substantial risks of the procedure. If Congrove is followed, plaintiffs
in Ohio often will obtain judgment without expert testimony on any
issue.
Fictional battery as distinguished from technical battery seeks
to remedy loss caused by side effects and to enforce disclosure of
the risks; actual battery attempts to compensate for the medical in-
trusion itself and to enforce disclosure of the doctor's contemplated
procedures. Implied actual consent is irrelevant in fictional battery
cases, because express consent usually is found. But the analogy has
an innuendo: as a matter of policy, the courts should treat the
absence of information as trespassory, i.e., the nondisclosure should
be treated as if the patient had not consented to the procedure.
Pennsylvania opinions sometimes analyze disclosure issues in
terms of trespass; thus, these opinions lend support to the fictional
battery theory.'89 The general approach of Pennsylvania law is to
use the misrepresentation model with an element of objective
materiality and to require expert testimony to establish risks,
magnitude, and physical causation; but expert testimony is not needed
to show medical customs of disclosure or to demonstrate
187. 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973).
188. 37 Ohio Misc. at 100, 308 N.E.2d at 768.
189. Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 633 (1966).
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materiality.9 ' The cases label the claim as a trespass action, and one
decision stipulates that the interest primarily protected is physical
integrity. 9'
In Gray v. Grunnagle,'92 the plaintiff filed counts of both
trespass and negligence but withdrew the negligence count at trial.
Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court adjudged
for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. The reviewing court
reversed on the rationale of the vitiation of consent, or fictional bat-
tery."' 3 A malpractice rationale would have worked as well, because
the plaintiff's evidence included expert testimony that the custom
among doctors was to advise patients of risks, and this defendant
did not. 9 ' An actual battery rationale also could be derived from the
record because, according to the plaintiff, the defendant proposed
exploratory surgery, after which the plaintiff was to decide whether
to have corrective surgery; during the exploration, the defendant at-
tempted to correct the condition he found and worsened the plain-
tiffs condition. There was a 10-15% chance of aggravating the condi-
tion even with skillful surgery, and the defendant had not disclosed
this risk.
A federal opinion applying Pennsylvania law, Dunham v.
Wright,9 ' reviewed the "imperfectly articulated" Pennsylvania
Supreme Court opinion in Gray and, in effect, applied a consumer
misrepresentation model. Dunham acknowledged the doctor's obliga-
tion to disclose alternatives, if any, and their risks. The opinion
stated that Pennsylvania law denies a therapeutic privilege to
withhold the information, but the court affirmed a judgment entered
on a verdict for the defendant. The record showed that the defend-
ant had advised the plaintiffs decedent of some risks, but not of the
risk of death from thyroidectomy. The evidence, however, showed
that alternative treatments had failed already and that the decedent
was very ill. The trial court gave an objective materiality instruc-
tion which the reviewing court approved. The withheld information
made no reasonable difference and, objectively considered, no real
alternative existed. The plaintiff had offered no expert testimony to
establish local medical standards of disclosure, and the defendant
did not assert any need for such evidence.' The opinion merits
190. Jeffries v. McCague, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 76, 363 A.2d 1167 (1976); Cooper v.
Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971).
191. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971).
192. 423 Pa. 194, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).
193. 423 Pa. at 206, 223 A.2d at 674.
194. 423 Pa. at 203, 223 A.2d at 672.
195. 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970).
196. Id. at 945 n.9.
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praise for ascertaining ambiguous state law with trespassory over-
tones and for discussing fulfillment and breach of duty instead of ex-
istence vel non of duty.
1 97
This trespassory construct has at least two ominous implica-
tions. One is punitive damages. The second is an award of damages
for the intrusion itself. A third, less threatening, implication is the
applicable statute of limitations. Otherwise, fictional battery
resembles the deceit model or one of its variations and requires proof
of actual subjective reliance but no proof of objective materiality.
Case law shows heightened judicial scrutiny of the withholding
of information if alternatives exist and if the defendant chooses an
unorthodox method.198 An extreme example of the unorthodox is ex-
perimentation.
A special case of fictional battery is experimentation upon a
naive subject. Even if a jurisdiction follows the malpractice model
and if the legislature has restricted the availability of battery
remedies in a medical context, the doctor who performs a novel or
exploratory operation and discloses the procedure without explain-
ing its experimental character commits a battery.1 9
Another issue related to new procedures is that of novice
surgeons. A Texas case, Wilson v. Scott,"°' presents both issues. The
plaintiff had lost hearing in his left ear after a stapedectomy with a
vein graft to correct hearing impairment he suffered for twenty
years. The defendant had explained that the operation was new, com-
plex, and delicate, that it might not succeed, that the hearing of the
plaintiff might deteriorate, and that the plaintiff might die in the
surgery or lose his sense of taste. °1 But the parties bitterly disputed
197. Ciccarone v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1972), represents a less
satisfactory federal opinion. Plaintiff-veteran sued VA doctors. The court ruled for the
defendants when the doctors discussed benefits and consequences of a meningitis test
with plaintiff and his wife, but failed to give the percentage probabilities of risks. If ra-
tionalized as a case of unproven objective materiality or of substantial compliance with
the obligation to warn (no breach), the case would be unexceptional in Pennsylvania.
But the court says the facts strike a fair balance between the interest of the patient in
information and the interest of doctors to practice medicine without "harassment."
Doctrinally the statement is wrong in a misrepresentation jurisdiction and would be
wrong even in a malpractice jurisdiction, where the interests balanced (information,
therapy) are interests of the patient. The comment is unjudicious and completely un-
necessary, since the alternate ground of limitations was an adequate ground for judg-
ment.
198. 26 A.D.2d 693, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1966) (involving a radical "spinal twist"
operation).
199. Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. App. 33, 588 P.2d 236 (1978). Contra, Karp v.
Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
200. 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
201. Id. at 301-02.
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whether the defendant had also mentioned the 1% chance of total
deafness in the left ear. The court consciously chose the malpractice
model and rejected both the misrepresentation model and the
hybrid model; the opinion implies an element of objective materiality
but not subjective reliance."2 The court found the scintilla of expert
testimony the plaintiff needed to gain access to the jury in the cross
examination of the defendant, when the doctor said "such warning is
standard and I gave it."' °3 The plaintiff urged as a breach the admit-
ted failure of the defendant to warn that this stapedectomy would
be the first performed independently on a live patient; previously,
the defendant had done stapedectomies on cadavers and in the
course of special training had watched other surgeons. The court did
not address the argument. The plaintiff had alleged that the surgery
was an experiment and a battery. In dissent, three judges of the
closely-divided court noted that of the three theories originally
pleaded (battery, deceit, and negligence), only the first two were
urged to the appellate court;2 °' thus, the majority could not adopt
the negligence model and grant a new trial on a negligence theory."5
Arguing the negligence theory before the supreme court, the plain-
tiff's counsel conceded a broad therapeutic privilege to doctors, and
the court tentatively agreed with him.2 0
The allegations of battery in Gaston and Wilson are likely to be
repeated when surgery seems experimental. But, the battery in ex-
perimental settings will be fictional, since the patient unwittingly
consents to the procedure; he actually is deceived. Yet in English-
speaking legal systems, fictional actions are derived, in the growth
of modern substantive law, from the fictional trespasses.
FORMS OF ACTION AND GRAPHIC METHODS
Lawyers who read literally the practice statutes that abolish the
traditional forms of action and who believe that those statutes are
fully effective appreciate neither legal history nor current legal and
social trends. A literal reliance upon practice statutes overlooks the
use of analogy in the evolution of both doctrine and policy and the
usefulness of forms to formulate advice to clients, to prepare cases,
and to predict judicial decisions. For those reasons, Professor F.W.
Maitland recommended the continuing study of common law forms
and of the process by which antecedents evolved into new forms. In
202. Id.
203. Id. at 303.
204. Id. at 304-05.
205. Id. For a more extreme example of waiver of an error in trial court rulings on
informed consent, see Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957).
206. 412 S.W.2d at 301.
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Forms of Action at Common Law,2 7 he employed a branching line
diagram to describe the evolution of forms and to illustrate the
splintering of trespass, the foremost English writ, into the abun-
dance of remedies which order the freedom of men and women in
the English-speaking world.
Understanding how Maitland would describe the tort of failure
to obtain informed consent requires consideration of that great
bifurcation when case split from trespass and redivided into deceit,
negligence, and other forms. Now those subbranches are reconverg-
ing and coinciding, bending back toward the main trunk of trespass
itself. Statutes also contribute in varying degrees to model building.
STATUTES
Twenty-three states have so-called informed consent statutes. 8
A number of categories exist. One group functions as "rules of
evidence" laws,0 9 specifying the force and effect of items like writ-
ten forms. The laws in the second group are "substantive laws," 10
specifying the elements of claims and defenses. For example, they
may fully or partially preempt the standards question by specifying
the information a physician must disclose. The Washington statute
is both evidentiary and substantive. The laws of Florida, Maine,
New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island have a variety of mostly
procedural contents that make them hard to classify.
Besides these twenty-three states, five states have statutes
about consent but not informed consent. 1
207. F. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW-Two COURSES
OF LECTURES 348 (A. Chaytor & W. Whittaker eds. 1909).
208. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852
(1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.132 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 39-4304 (Supp. 1976);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320 (Supp. 1976);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (Supp. 1976); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-C:1 & 507-C:2; N.Y. [PUB
HEALTH] LAW § 3805-d (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 (Supp. 1976); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1301.103 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §
23-3414 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908
(1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050 (Supp. 1976); WYO. STAT. § 33-340.14 (1976).
209. The states comprising the group are Idaho, Iowa, Nevada and Ohio.
210. The second group of states is Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. The
Texas statute delegates standard formulation to a disclosure panel whose rules become
similar to legislated standards or matters of law.
211. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-363 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2908 (1976); LA. R.S.
40:1299.40 (Supp. 1975 & 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
431.061 (Vernon).
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OTHER FORMS AND OTHER PROFESSIONS
Medicine is the most fertile field for the growth of the informed
consent doctrine, because medical side effects can be dramatic and
the profession's tradition of withholding information about even
serious matters is striking and stubborn. But the informed consent
doctrine occasionally appears in other fields, in which its develop-
ment is more limited.
Giving advice about legal consequences (predicting the legal
behavior of judges, tax collectors, and other officials) is a main
aspect of the practice of law. Lawyers sometimes are obligated to
volunteer information or to initiate discussion about consequences
with clients who have not requested that information. These obliga-
tions are defined by professional standards of skill.212 Most opinions
do not concern "side effects," but the failure of the main objective of
the action. Conversely, some side effects (e.g., tax consequences of a
transaction undertaken for reasons other than tax avoidance) can oc-
cur in law. The cases imply that if a dispute about informed consent
to a side effect risk exists, the courts generally follow a malpractice
model. If overtones of another tort are found in cases of withheld
legal advice, the actions resemble conversion or wrongful detention
of the choice which "ultimately" belongs to the client.213
Though informed consent cases are infrequent in the field of
education, one notable decision is Thomas v. Chicago Board of
Education."' The plaintiff alleged that his coach and the school
board had failed to warn him of the risks of spinal injury from tack-
ling opposing players in football competition on artificial turf.1 5 The
trial court dismissed that count, and the appellate court did not
even discuss it, affirming the lower court's judgment for the defend-
ants. The context and allegations suggest that counsel for the plain-
tiff relied on a consumer misrepresentation model.
ETHICAL JURISPRUDENCE
The different legal models reflect competing virtues identified
by the moralists. Joseph Fletcher2"' acknowledges that caring and
honesty appear to conflict but argues that concern usually implies
honesty; thus the instances of genuine conflict are infrequent. He
notes that medical codes give little attention to the problem of
212. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 311-14 (1977).
213. Id. at 312-13.
214. 60 Ill. App. 3d 729, 377 N.E.2d 55 (1978).
215. 60 I1. App. 3d at 732, 377 N.E.2d at 57.
216. J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 34-64 (1954).
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honest communication to patients. Standards are hard to find, but
Fletcher cites persuasive writings by physicians who disclose that
the growth of benevolent lying hurts both the doctor and the pa-
tient.
Fletcher argues that outright dishonesty and half-truths are in-
distinguishable in a relationship of trust and provides four reasons
why both are wrong. The first reason is the human and moral status
of the patient. Nondisclosure of diagnosis and alternatives to the pa-
tient disregards his capacities for moral choice and reasoning and
dehumanizes him. Fletcher gives pastoral examples in which the
receipt of bad news has given patients opportunities for courage,
reason, and truly inspiring human action. A second reason is the
preservation of the confidence itself. A patient is hurt when he finds
that a doctor has not confided in him. A third reason is self-
determination. Fletcher considers the action of nondisclosure to be
usurpation, and he admonishes physicians to refuse responsibilities
which are not theirs. His fourth rationale employs the concept of in-
tellectual property, suggesting conversion or invasion. Fletcher con-
cludes that the withheld facts belong to the patient and are valuable
because patients want them. Though he discusses diagnostic find-
ings, his argument is equally applicable to risks of treatment. The
election among alternatives is the patient's; the physician must not
steal the patient's vote.
Fletcher purports to be neither strict nor lax about honesty. But
he strongly favors complete disclosure. However, he concedes too
readily that children and incompetent patients do not possess a
claim to full disclosure and defends lying by psychologists because
therapy sometimes depends on it. He contradicts his moral urgings
by expressing as a mitigating factor the view that psychiatric state-
ments are less well-established and more opinionated than other
medical statements. This position is contrary to his observation that
accuracy and veracity are different and that to discuss the uncer-
tainty of facts when the issue is morality misleads. When the facts
are uncertain, doctors should be most forthright. Honesty in ex-
pressing opinions should be equivalent to that in reporting concrete
facts. In fields other than psychiatry, Fletcher recognizes only a
small therapeutic reservation.
Like Fletcher, Sissela Bok 17 properly distinguishes between
truth and truthfulness and insists that deception may occur through
silence; she focuses her inquiry on lying in a narrower sense. 18 She
217. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
218. Id. at 6-16.
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restricts the use of deception as "therapy"21' and attacks typical
justifications physicians give for deception."' Bok agrees with Flet-
cher that unhappy information may produce good moral and medical
results in patients, scientifically demolishing the paternalistic argu-
ment that ignorance is best. She cites research data that 80% of af-
fected patients keenly want to know unsatisfactory findings and col-
lateral risks. These data corroborate the kind of pastoral and anec-
dotal reports that Fletcher had mentioned a quarter century earlier.
Bok forcefully insists that the impossibility of scientific precision is
no excuse for intentional falsehood.
Unlike Fletcher, Bok is disinclined to suspend principles for the
treatment of children and incompetents. She notes the corrosive ef-
fect of lying on character and argues that implying the consent of an
incompetent man by reasoning from the perspective of a reasonable
man is deficient. 21 Bok argues powerfully in favor of truthfulness
and extends the presumption favoring honesty more widely than
Fletcher.
If these moralists were judges confronting a de novo issue in
their courts, Bok and Fletcher would adopt a misrepresentation
model requiring a moderate to weak element of objective materiali-
ty and affording doctors a narrow affirmative defense of therapeutic
privilege. Thus, Bok, Fletcher, and other sources they cite adopt
principles used by the courts in Colorado, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, and Washington.
CONCLUSIONS
Models and Law-Making
Reviewing courts should seek to fashion good law, giving ap-
propriate weight to the policy of stability. This duty implies that
they should proceed cautiously, evolutionally, and by analogy.
Courts should draw freely upon a number of prior forms, but should
acknowledge their use of analogies and respond when the bar
criticizes weak analogies. The judiciary should treat informed con-
sent disputes as neither completely sui generis nor entirely
predetermined by other classes of torts. Courts must implement the
intent of the legislature if a statute exists defining the elements of
an informed consent action. A fair and clearly defined tort would re-
quire the plaintiff to prove the elements enumerated below.
219. Id. at 221-26.
220. Id. at 226-38.
221. Id. at 218.
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Elements. To be able to recover, the plaintiff should have to
plead and prove:
1. The risks of treatment and the existence of alternatives;
2. The general frequency or incidence of the risks of the various
alternatives;
3. That occurrence of the risk is not unprecedented, that compe-
tent doctors know the risks, and that the plaintiff actually did
not know the undisclosed risks or alternatives;
4. That the physician did not tell the plaintiff of some risks or
alternatives;
5. That to a reasonable person with the plaintiff's condition, the un-
disclosed risks or alternatives are decisive factors in foregoing,
postponing, or replacing the treatment;
6. That if the information had been disclosed, the plaintiff would
have foregone, postponed, or replaced the treatment;
7. That an undisclosed risk materialized in the plaintiff and
worsened his condition;
8. That the worsening exceeds the deterioration of the plaintiff's
condition that would have occurred had the treatment been
postponed, cancelled, or modified;
9. The monetary value of the difference between the incremental
worsening and the deterioration avoided.
Scientific proof. Courts should require scientific proof by expert
testimony of elements 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 if those elements are con-
tested. A doctor should be permitted to express an opinion on the
actions of the "prudent patient," based on his observation of the
behavior of patients (element 5).
Affirmative defense. The law should excuse nondisclosure if the
defendant pleads and proves any one of the following facts or cir-
cumstances:
1. Limitations. The plaintiff filed suit after the time permitted by
malpractice, negligence, or personal injury limitation statutes.
2. Common knowledge. The risk would have been known by an or-
dinarily prudent and knowledgeable person with the patient's
condition.
3. Emergency. The condition of the patient would worsen severely
during the delay in treatment caused by taking time to inform,
causing the probability of success in treatment to decline greatly.
4. Incompetent patient. The patient is an infant younger than 14
years of age or is so mentally infirm that his testamentary
capacity is insufficient, and the physician informed the parent or
the principal caretaker of plaintiff of the risks.
5. Medical practice. Minimally competent doctors who value pa-
1980]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tient self-determination would nevertheless not disclose the
risks or alternatives under the circumstances. (The source of
standards is that segment of the medical community that values
opportunities for choice by patients. In some communities this
source may be co-extensive with the whole profession.)
Other forms. Courts should reserve the actual battery remedies
for cases of a true absence of consent to touch, but should not use
the tort of battery to adjudicate cases involving collateral risks and
effects. Courts should imply readily actual consent from the cir-
cumstances in most medical cases. Courts usually should decide even
those instances in which a physician affirmatively lies to a patient as
a part of the new tort, not as classical deceit, since those lies usually
will lack the element of malice.
Damages. The courts should adopt the Waltz-Inbau calculus of
compensatory damages. Absent actual battery or an extraordinary
lie to the patient, courts never should award punitive damages in
"informed consent" cases. In situations of actual lying, the courts
should require clear and convincing proof of an intent to hurt or em-
barrass the plaintiff, in addition to evidence of the knowledge of
falsity. The possibility of recovery may seem rare. But the elevated
burden of proof is essential to balance honesty and freedom against a
practical rule that deters perjury and greed. The significance of
lawyering consists in advancing transcendent goals in a domain of
imperfect compliance, or of promoting justice in the world of prac-
tical affairs. Informed consent cases manifest that importance.
THEORY OF THE TORT IFORM OF ACTION)
IMPLICATIONS OF
THEORY
1. Right (Interest Pro-
tected)
2. Correlative Duty of
M.D.
3. Source of Standard of
Disclosure
4. Element of Decision by
Patient
TECHNICAL BATTERY PROFESSIONAL
MODEL NEGLIGENCE MODEL
Bodily integrity and self-
determination.
Not to touch w/o permission.
General advice to patient
what M.D. will do when he
lays on hands.
Rules of law about uncon-
sented touching, the courts.
Express consent or actual
consent implied in fact.
Balance of interests in good
care and self-determination.
Emphasis on good care.
Use skill in giving and with-
holding information about
risks and alternatives.
Medical community and its
practices.
Jurisdictions divided be-
tween objective materiality
and subjective reliance.
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IMPLICATIONS OF
THEORY
5. Medical Expert Testi-
mony
a. Fact and Magnitude
of Risks
b. Existence of Alter-
natives
c. Scienter (knowledge,
constr. knowl., should
know, etc.)
d. Causation-in-Fact
e. Materiality or Reli-
ance (patient deci-
sional element)
f. Adequacy of Disclo-
sure (breach of stan-
dard of disclosure)
6. Medical Justifications
or privileges
a. Emergency
b. Incapacity
c. Therapeutics
7. Other Justification De-
fenses
a. Patient Request
b. Common Knowledge
c. Implied Consent
8. Compensatory
Damages
a. Intrusion per se
b. Waltz-Inbau Credit
to Defendant
9. Punitive Damages
10. Common Law Genesis
11. Jurisdictions Recogniz-
ing
12. Comment
TECHNICAL BATTERY
MODEL
Not even relevant.
Not even relevant.
Not even relevant.
Not even relevant.
Not even relevant.
Not even relevant.
Available
Available
Not available
Not relevant
Not relevant to this theory.
Available and usually found
in medical cases.
Awardable and presumed.
Applicability questionable.
Awardable
Battery is an old tort.
Recognized everywhere.
New torts have not abol-
ished battery. New tort
remedies cumulative with
battery.
Not to be forgotten.
PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE MODEL
Required
Required
Required
Required
Sometimes required where
objec. mat. is Element (e.g.,
Ill.).
Required
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Not Relevant
Not awardable
Should be applicable but not
recognized explicitly.
Not awardable
Case
All but Ga.
Consumer model states will
a fortiori give relief when
the proof by plaintiff fulfills
this model.
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THEORY OF THE TORT (FORM OF ACTION)
IMPLICATIONS OF
THEORY
1. Right (Interest Pro-
tected)
2. Correlative Duty of
M.D.
3. Source of Standard of
Disclosure
4. Element of Decision by
Patient
5. Medical Expert Testi-
mony
a. Fact and Magnitude
of Risks
b. Existence of Alter-
natives
c. Scienter (knowl.,
constr. knowl., should
know of M.D.)
d. Causation in Fact
(materialization of
the risk)
e. Materiality or Reli-
ance Element (pa-
tient decision ele-
ment)
f. Adequacy of Disclo-
sure (breach or not of
standard of disclo-
sure).
6. Medical Justifications
or Privileges
a. Emergency
b. Incapacity
c. Therapeutics
7. Other Justification
Defenses
a. Patient Request
b. Common Knowledge
c. Implied Consent
CONSUMER FRAUD
MODEL
Balance of Interests (good
care, choice). Emphasis on
info., choice, self-determina-
tion.
Inform Patient fully, in all
but extreme circumstances,
about risks and alterna-
tives.
Community at large (objec-
tive) or the particular pa-
tient (subjective).
Jurisdictions divided be-
tween objective mat., actual
subj. reliance. Maybe both
obj. mat. and subj. reliance
in some jurisdictions (e.g.,
Ill., Wash., and Mass.).
Required in most cases.
Required in most cases.
Required in most cases.
Required in most cases.
Relevant to object. mater.
but not required. Not rele-
vant when subj. reliance is
the element.
Not required in P.F. case of
Pl.
Available
Available
Affirmative defense in some
jurisdictions (e.g., Colo.,
Wash., Kan., D.C., N.J.).
Available
Available
Not relevant
FICTIONAL BATTERY
MODEL
Self-determination and bod-
ily integrity; emphasis on
self-determination.
To give the patient exquis-
ite instructions about risks
and alternatives.
The patient himself
Subjective reliance
Required
Required
Required
Required
Not required, not even rele-
vant, given subj. reliance
element.
Expert testimony not re-
quired.
Available
Available
Not available
Available
Available
Not available
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IMPLICATIONS OF
THEORY
CONSUMER FRAUD
MODEL
FICTIONAL BATTERY
MODEL
8. Compensatory
Damages
a. Intrusion per se
b. Waltz-Inbau Credit
to Defendant
9. Punitive Damages
10. Common Law Genesis
11. Jurisdictions Recogniz-
ing
12. Comment
Apparently not compensa- Awardable
ble.
Arguably applicable but not
recognized explicitly.
Not available absent speci-
fic intent to deceive.
Tort of deceit; case, not
trespass.
Cal., La., Mass., Md., Or.,
Pa., R.I., Vt., Wis. Hybrids:
Colo., Wash., Kan., D.C.,
N.J., Fla.
The boundary between this
and the malpractice model
is blurred in the American
cases. Local variations
abound.
Arguably available
Arguably awardable
Trespass, not case.
Ohio, maybe Pa.
An extreme theory.
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